如何理解对自我的义务?——基于康德伦理学的分析  

How to Understand the Duty to Myself? An Analysis Based on Kantian Ethics

作　　者：刘作 LIU Zuo

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2024年第4期57-69,197,共14页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“康德《伦理学讲义》的翻译与研究”(项目编号:22BZX078)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：我们在日常生活中经常提到对自我的义务,但是对自我的义务面对着无法解释义务概念中强制性的困难。康德通过区分自我的两种不同视角来解决这个困难,并赋予对自我的义务以基础性地位。对自我的义务是形式的,它是具体的对自我的义务以及对他人的义务的前提。没有对自我的义务,就没有其他义务。康德的解决方式,既回应了安斯康姆否认存在着对自我义务的批评,又不需要预设达沃尔的第二人称的理由。然而,这种解决方式以先验观念论为基础,当代建构主义者没有预设先验观念论,但也没有给予这一义务以基础性的地位。We often refer to the duty to myself in our daily life,but the duty to myself faces the difficulty of explaining the constrain in the concept of duty in theory.Kant solves this difficulty by distinguishing between two different perspectives of the self and giving foundational status to the duty to myself.The duty to myself is formal,which is the precondition for the concrete duty to myself and the duty to others.Without the duty to myself,there is no other duty.Kant’s solution refutes Anscombe’s denial of the existence of the duty to myself,without the need to presuppose Darwall’s reason for the second person.However,Kant’s solution is based on his transcendental idealism,which contemporary constructivism does not presuppose,but the latter does not give the duty to myself a foundational status.

关 键 词：对自我的义务 自我的两种视角 安斯康姆 第二人称的理由 先验观念论 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]