关于社会实践的理论必须“符合”社会实践吗?——对德沃金诠释主义的一个批判  

“Fit”as a Dimension of Social Practice Theories:A Critique of Dworkin’s Interpretivism

作　　者：骆意中 LUO Yizhong

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学哲学与法政学院

出　　处：《哲学分析》2024年第4期94-107,198,共15页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“法律的规范性与元规范理论研究”(项目编号:21FFXB064)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：诠释主义不认为社会实践能够完全通过社会事实来说明,而认为需要给社会实践附加价值本旨,得出相关判断的最佳证成。但是为了保证对于社会实践的说明仍然是诠释而不是创造了某种并不真实存在的实践,以德沃金为代表的诠释主义要求关于社会实践的理论需要符合这种社会实践,而这种符合面向需要满足的最重要条件是解释为什么在各种社会实践之中总会存在大量的理论分歧。然而,理论争议依然可以通过社会事实来解释,并且诠释主义在说明理论争议的时候依然预设了诸如效力在内的概念,从而无法真正满足符合面向。Interpretivists argue against the idea that social practices can be fully explained by social facts.To explain a specific social practice,a value point needs to be imposed on it to get the best justification for related judgments.But to make sure that an explanation remains to be an interpretation,instead of an invention of a certain social practice,interpretivism introduces a“dimension of fit”,so that any interpretation has to fit a genuine social practice.According to such a dimension,any social practice theory would have to account for the prevalence of theoretical disagreement.However,theoretical disagreement still can be accommodated by social facts,and interpretivism’s presumption of ideas such as validity makes itself vulnerable to the dimension of fit.

关 键 词：社会实践 诠释主义 理论争议 社会事实 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]