基于随机突变的“平台-商家”反合作行为弹性研究  

Research on anti-cooperation behavior and elasticity of“Platform-Merchant”based on stochastic catastrophe theory

作　　者：危小超[1] 蒋贵艳 佘其平 WEI Xiaochao;JIANG Guiyan;SHE Qiping(School of Economics,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;School of Information Management,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,武汉430070 [2]湖北经济学院信息管理学院,武汉430070

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第7期2325-2338,共14页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72271192,72371110,71971093);教育部人文社会科学基金(22YJC630152)。

摘　　要：电商平台及商家在营销活动中的反合作行为作为影响平台健康发展的关键因素,已成为平台最关注的问题之一.基于“平台-商家”反合作行为演化博弈模型,引入白噪声和随机微分方程并结合突变理论构建随机尖点突变模型,分析反合作行为非线性演化过程.在此基础上,引入弹性指标衡量平台的稳健性并对模型进行数值仿真.结果表明:1)当收益或成本改变时,增大弹性能提高平台稳健性;但是当获利概率改变时,则应控制(减少)弹性,来维持平台稳健性.2)单因素分析发现,收益对弹性具有正向影响,但是成本与弹性负相关;获利概率与弹性呈倒“V”关系,即存在实现弹性最大的获利概率值;有趣的是,损失并不影响弹性(突变发生).3)双因素分析发现,增加成本或降低收益能增强获利概率对弹性的作用,然而成本增加能减缓收益对弹性的正向影响.本研究对“平台-商家”反合作行为演化的内在突变规律及平台运营弹性控制策略具有重要的理论和实践价值.The anti-cooperative behavior of e-commerce platforms and merchants in marketing activities,as a key factor affecting the healthy development of the platform,has become one of the most concerning issues for the platform.Based on the“Platform-Merchant”anti-cooperative behavior evolution game model,white noise and stochastic differential equations are introduced,and a stochastic catastrophe model is constructed by combining catastrophe theory to analyze the nonlinear evolution process of anti-cooperative behavior.On this basis,We introduce elastic indicators to measure the robustness of the platform and conduct numerical simulations on the model.The results indicate that:1)Increasing elasticity can improve platform robustness when benefits or costs change;however,when the probability of profitability changes,resilience should be controlled(reduced)to maintain platform robustness.2)Single-factor analysis shows that returns have a positive impact on resilience,but costs are negatively correlated with resilience;there is an inverse“V”relationship between profit probability and elasticity,which means there exists a profit probability value that maximizes the elasticity;interestingly,losses do not affect elasticity(sudden changes occur).3)Two-factor analysis found that increasing costs or reducing returns can enhance the effect of profit probability on elasticity while increasing costs can slow down the positive impact of returns on elasticity.This study has important theoretical and practical value for the internal mutation law of the evolution of“Platform-Merchant”anti-cooperative behavior and platform operation elasticity control strategies.

关 键 词：电商平台 演化博弈 尖点突变 弹性 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]