君子和而不同? 非国有股东委派董事与 国有企业董事会异议  

Gentlemen Seek Harmony but Not Uniformity?Non-state-owned Shareholders’Appointment of Directors and Dissenting Opinions at Chinese SOE’s Board Meetings

作　　者：孔晓旭 唐晓萌 柳学信[2] Kong Xiaoxu;Tang Xiaomeng;Liu Xuexin(School of Economics,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070;College of Business Administration,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学经济学院,北京100070 [2]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,北京100070

出　　处：《管理评论》2024年第7期232-245,共14页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72002141);国家社会科学基金项目(22&ZD145);北京市教育委员会科研计划项目(SM202310038013);首都经济贸易大学新入职青年教师科研启动基金项目(XRZ2023058)。

摘　　要：发展混合所有制经济是国有企业改革的重要突破口,而引入非国有资本是新时期深化国有企业混合所有制改革的主要模式,但现有研究缺少非国有股东委派董事如何影响董事会决策的内在机制研讨。本文以2008—2019年沪深A股国有上市公司为样本,考察非国有股东委派董事通过增加国有企业董事会异议影响治理绩效的作用机制。研究发现,非国有股东委派董事对国有企业董事会异议有显著的正向影响,且政府干预难度、行业竞争程度、企业内部控制水平发挥正向调节作用;并且非国有股东委派董事通过增加董事会异议提升国有企业治理绩效,从而实现“君子和而不同”的效果。本研究厘清国有企业混合所有制改革背景下董事会内部决策过程及影响机制,能够为进一步完善混合所有制企业治理机制提供参考。Mixed ownership is an important breakthrough of state-owned enterprise reform,and the introduction of non-state-owned capital is a key step to reform state-owned enterprises(SOEs)toward mixed ownership in the new era.However,the existing researches lack relevant theoretical discussions in response to the questions of how directors appointed by a non-state shareholder affect the decisionmaking of the board of directors,whether dissenting opinions should be dampened in the board meeting and how to further influence the governance performance of state-owned enterprises.This paper takes A-share listed SOEs in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2019 as samples and uses board resolution announcements as the source of shareholder unit ownership and board voting data of board members,and investigates the mechanism of how directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders affect governance performance by dissenting from board decisions of state-owned enterprises.It is found that directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders play a significant positive role in hearing voice of dissent at SOE’s board meetings,and the difficulty of government intervention,the degree of industry competition,and the level of internal control of enterprises play a positive moderating role.Further research finds that non-state-owned shareholders’appointment of directors can improve SOE’s governance performance by increasing board dissent,thus achieving the result of“harmony but not uniformity”.This study clarifies the internal decision-making mechanism and influence mechanism of the board of directors,as well as the adjustment mechanism of macro and micro factors under the background of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs.The findings complement the study of the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders and the influencing factors of the board of directors,and also supplement the study of the influencing mechanism of SOE’s performance,providing a reference for further improving the governance mechanism of

关 键 词：国有企业 混合所有制改革 非国有股东委派董事 董事会异议 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]