薪酬管制降低了国有企业研发投资吗?——基于政府“限薪令”自然实验的证据  

Does Compensation Regulation Reduce R&D Investment?—Evidence from Natural Experiment of Government's Pay Ceiling Order

作　　者：苏坤[1] 赵艳 王颖晖[1] SU Kun;ZHAO Yan;WANG Ying-hui(School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an 710129,China)

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710129

出　　处：《系统工程》2024年第4期102-122,共21页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72172127,71773088);西北工业大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(D5000230054)。

摘　　要：以政府“限薪令”政策为背景,本文使用2007-2018年上市公司数据研究了薪酬管制政策对国有企业研发投资的影响以及内外部治理机制的调节作用。通过直接测度薪酬管制程度和建立双重差分模型(DID)两种方式,研究发现薪酬管制会导致高管薪酬激励不足、风险规避动机增强,进而抑制国有企业研发投资;而管理层持股有助于缓解薪酬管制对国有企业研发投资的不利影响;与社会信任水平较低地区相比,在社会信任水平较高地区薪酬管制对国有企业研发投资的不利影响相对较弱;内外部治理机制能够有效约束薪酬管制所带来的不利后果。本研究深化了对薪酬管制经济后果的认知,对进一步推动国有企业薪酬制度改革具有重要启示意义。Based on the government's pay ceiling order,this paper uses the data of China's listed state-owned enterprises in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2007 to 2018 to discuss the impact of compensation regulation on R&D investment and the moderating effect of internal and external governance mechanisms.By directly measuring the degree of compensation regulation and using the difference-in-differences(DID)model,we find that compensation regulation can reduce the compensation incentives of top executives and increase their motivation to avoid risks,which in turn inhibits the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises.Further research shows that management shareholding is helpful in alleviating the negative impact of compensation regulation on the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises.Compared with regions with low social trust,compensation regulation has less impact on R&D investment in regions with high social trust.This shows that the internal and external governance mechanisms can effectively restrain the adverse consequences of compensation regulation.Our findings deepen the understanding of the economic consequences of compensation regulation and have important significance for further promoting the compensation system reform of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：薪酬管制 限薪令 内外部治理机制 企业研发投资 

分 类 号：F202[经济管理—国民经济] F230