量能度权:集团公司差异化管控的底层逻辑与治理对策  

Endowment‑Based Authority:Differentiated Control’s Paths and Countermeasures of Business Groups

作　　者：方政[1] 武常岐 项安波[2] FANG Zheng;WU Chang‑qi;XIANG An‑bo(School of Management,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China;Enterprise Research Institute,Development Research Center of the State Council,Beijing 100010,China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]国务院发展研究中心企业研究所,北京100010

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2024年第9期61-77,共17页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“集团公司差异化管控的实现路径与治理优化研究”(23BGL129)。

摘　　要：集团公司差异化管控能够优化不同出资主体的权力配置,然而集团公司管控现有研究对有限理性的默认假设缺乏关注,无法为集团公司差异化管控提供理论支持。本文基于不完全契约理论,指出集团公司差异化管控的底层逻辑是实际控制人、子公司其他股东和子公司高管围绕关键资源禀赋、子公司对集团公司的重要程度和依赖程度等影响因素进行剩余控制权优化配置。同时,剩余控制权配置过程会产生异质性配置结果,进而产生不同的管控模式和代理问题,这就需要辅以异质性治理结构与机制安排,以降低潜在治理成本。本文通过解构上述过程,主要回答了集团公司差异化管控的底层逻辑、分类依据和治理对策等三个核心命题,不仅可以助力集团公司差异化管控实践,还能够为完善中国特色现代企业制度、弘扬企业家精神提供有益启示。The different control systems from ultimate owners are commonly adopted in business groups’governance practices.However,there are still practical pain points,greatly limiting the overall efficiency of business groups.This article responds to the Resolution on Further Deepening of Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization passed by the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.It aims to deconstruct the underlying logic and governance strategies of differentiated control in business groups,providing feasible practical paths for promoting independent operation in natural monopoly sectors and market‑oriented reform in competitive sectors.Based on transaction cost economy’s proposition of bounded rationality and incomplete contracts theory’s principles of residual control rights allocation,this article focuses on three core issues,exploring the theoretical boundary and mechanisms designing of business group’s differentiated control:Firstly,this article clarifies that the allocation of residual control rights within the context of a business group is a collaborative governance process involving the bargaining among ultimate owners,subsidiaries’other shareholders,and subsidiaries’executives.Notably,ultimate owners should dominate this allocation process.Secondly,in terms of classification criteria,it proposes that the scarcity of capital endowment and business group’s internal market advantages are the key factors influencing the above allocation process,indicating the specific methods to categorize the subsidiaries.Thirdly,this allocation process leads to heterogeneous governance structures.In terms of governance strategies,it constructs targeted governance optimization strategies based on the above different allocation results,demonstrating the methodology to execute differentiated control.The theoretical contributions are reflected in the following aspects.First,it deconstructs the differentiated control of business groups from the perspective o

关 键 词：集团公司 差异化管控 交易成本理论 不完全契约理论 剩余控制权 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]