生活世界与熟悉性——论卢曼对胡塞尔的批评  

Life-world and Familiarity:On Luhmann's Criticism of Husserl

作　　者：罗志达 Luo Zhida

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系[珠海]

出　　处：《哲学研究》2024年第8期89-98,128,共11页Philosophical Research

基　　金：国家重大人才支持计划(编号2022WRQB02);中山大学高校基本科研业务费项目“现象学与儒学视域下的生存论情感研究”(编号22wkqb10)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文主要考察卢曼对胡塞尔生活世界理论的批评,并集中分析熟悉性之于生活世界的建构性作用。在此基础上,通过分析胡塞尔生活世界理论中的熟悉性概念,本文将表明熟悉性是生活世界经验的根本特征;同时认为,卢曼对生活世界的理解乃是基于自然态度下的日常性,而胡塞尔的生活世界理论具有更深层面的、超越论哲学的考量。生活世界中的熟悉性具有三个维度:(1)生活世界作为“不变的风格”构成了预先被给予的意义来源;(2)我们对自身身体的熟悉性构成了生活世界经验的意义框架;(3)经验的类型化构成了生活世界之熟悉性的一般性特征。This paper aims to examine Luhmann's criticism of Husserl's theory of life-world with a focus on the constitutive significance of familiarity for the life-world.For this purpose,this paper will analyze the concept of familiarity in Husserl's theory of life-world and point out that familiarity serves as a founding feature of lifeworld experience.What is more,it will be suggested that Luhmann's conception of life-world is based on everydayness of natural attitude,whereas Husserl's theory of life-world has a transcendental orientation which goes deeper than natural attitude.Furthermore,three dimensions of the familiarity of life-world will be carefully examined:firstly,life-world as an"invariant style"serves as the source of pre-given meaningfulness;secondly,the familiarity of one's own body scaffolds a framework of meanings of life-world experience;thirdly,typification of experience characterizes the essential familiarity of life-world experience.

关 键 词：生活世界 熟悉性 类型 类型化 前述谓 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]