具有加性耦合效用和连续统参与人博弈中的强Nash均衡  

Strong Nash equilibria of games with additively coupled utilities and a continuum of players

作　　者：杨哲[1] YANG Zhe(School of Economics,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《运筹学学报（中英文）》2024年第3期143-152,共10页Operations Research Transactions

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.72371146)。

摘　　要：本文将研究具有加性耦合效用和连续统参与人博弈中的强Nash均衡。我们首先证明具有加性耦合效用和有限参与人博弈中强Nash均衡的存在性。进一步,对具有加性耦合效用和连续统参与人的博弈,我们引入弱强Nash均衡的概念,并证明它的存在性定理。本文发展了强Nash均衡的研究。In this paper,we study the strong Nash equilibria of games with additively coupled utilities and a continuum of players.We first prove the existence of strong Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled utilities and finitely many players.Furthermore,we introduce the notion of weak strong Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled utilities and a continuum of players,and prove the existence theorem.Our paper develops the work of strong Nash equilibria.

关 键 词：强Nash 均衡 加性耦合效用 连续统参与人 存在性 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]