政府监管下信息敏感型WEEE双渠道回收策略研究  

Research on dual channel recycling strategy of information sensitive WEEE under government supervision

作　　者：王方 尹雪薇 余乐安 WANG Fang;YIN Xuewei;YU Lean(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an 710126,China;Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China;Shaanxi Soft Science Institute of Informatization and Digital Economy,Xi’an 710126,China)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610065 [3]陕西信息化与数字经济软科学研究基地,西安710126

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第8期2592-2604,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72001165);陕西省创新能力支撑计划(2022SR5016);西安市科技计划项目软科学研究重点项目(2023JH-RKXZD-0012)。

摘　　要：在政府监管环境下,考虑消费者参与信息敏感型电子废弃物(waste electrical and electronic equipment,WEEE)回收的影响因素,构建由非正规回收渠道和正规回收渠道组成的双渠道回收博弈模型,研究消费者信息敏感程度、政府监管水平和惩罚力度、非正规回收渠道信息泄露概率及正规回收渠道信息清理成本等因素对不同渠道最优策略选择的影响问题.通过比较不同模型下的最优值和不同因素不同水平下的数值分析结果,研究发现:1)消费者信息敏感程度较高或正规回收渠道的信息清理成本较低时,正规回收渠道的市场竞争力更强.2)政府监管水平较高时,能够抑制非正规回收渠道信息泄露行为的发生,促进消费者参与正规回收.3)非正规回收渠道信息泄露非法收益越高,正规回收渠道市场占有率越低,政府需花费的监管成本也越高.4)当非正规回收渠道选择不泄漏信息时,高消费者信息敏感系数和低信息清理成本对其转向正规回收有正向调节作用,反之则需要政府介入进行调节.Under the government supervision environment,considering the influencing factors of consumers’participation in information-sensitive waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE)recycling,a two-channel recycling game model composed of informal recycling channels and formal recycling channels is constructed.The influence of factors such as consumer information sensitivity coefficient,government supervision level and punishment intensity,information leakage probability of informal recycling channels and information cleaning cost of formal recycling channels on the optimal strategy selection of different channels is studied.By comparing the optimal values under different models and the numerical analysis results under different factors at different levels,the research finds that:1)When the consumer information sensitivity is higher or the information cleaning cost of the formal recycling channel is lower,the formal recycling channel has stronger market competitiveness.2)When the level of government supervision is high,the information leakage behavior of informal recycling channels can be suppressed and consumers can be promoted to participate in formal recycling.3)The higher the illegal income from information leakage of informal recycling channels,the lower the market share of formal recycling channels,and the higher the regulatory costs required by the government.4)When informal recycling channels choose not to disclose information,high consumer information sensitivity coefficient and low information cleaning cost have a positive moderating effect on their conversion to formal recycling;otherwise,government intervention is needed to regulate.

关 键 词：政府监管 双渠道回收 博弈模型 信息敏感型WEEE 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]