低碳合作供应链的内部合作协调与外部补贴激励机制设计  

Internal Cooperation Coordination and External Subsidy Mechanisms in Low-carbon Cooperative Supply Chains

作　　者：王玉燕[1] 林飞 申亮 WANG Yuyan;LIN Fei;SHEN Liang(School of Management Science and Engineering,Shandong University of Finance and Economics;School of Public Finance&Taxation,Shandong University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,250014 [2]山东财经大学财政税务学院,250014

出　　处：《经济研究》2024年第6期164-183,共20页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72371144);山东省泰山学者工程专项(tsqn202211197);济南市自主培养创新团队(202228075)的资助。

摘　　要：本文综合考虑合作成员的成本协同效应、信息不对称下的道德风险和碳减排的外部效应,构建了低碳合作供应链(LC-CSC)双边道德风险模型。针对模型均衡策略及其影响因素的解析显示,成本协同效应、碳定价及消费者低碳偏好均会激励减排行为,而道德风险引致成员产生的“机会主义”行为会削弱成员的碳减排努力。为此,本文求解了LC-CSC内部“合作协调契约”,并证明该契约对于内部成员的合作关系是公平有效率的。本文进一步发现,减排的正外部效应导致的“市场失灵”也会使得成员碳减排努力程度产生不足,需及时引入政府“补贴激励机制”来弥补,因此本文设计了政府事前补贴和事后补贴两种激励机制,以及兼顾减排社会福利和成员利润来剖析LC-CSC外部最优“补贴激励机制”。本文证明,当提供减排公共配套设施对成员减排成本的折扣力度较大时,政府应采用完善配套公共基础设施的事前补贴;反之,采用基于企业碳减排收益比例进行返还的事后补贴策略将更有利于社会福利。本文还利用中国碳交易试点城市的数据进行数值仿真,验证了模型的有效性。In the pursuit of dual-carbon goals of carbon dioxide peaking and carbon neutrality,enterprises emerge as the principal entities responsible for carbon reduction.The onus for emission reduction has thus extended across the entire supply chain,fostering the development of low-carbon cooperative supply chains(LC-CSCs).However,several factors,such as moral hazard,information asymmetry,and market externalities,hinder the effective implementation of cooperative emission reduction with in these chains.Addressing the following issues is critical:How do factors such as cost synergies among LC-CSC members,along with product and carbon markets,influence emission reduction decisions?How can LC-CSC members be effectively coordinated to collaborate on emission reduction?What external subsidy mechanisms should the government design to incentivize LC-CSC members'emission reduction behaviors?To address the aforementioned issues,this paper integrates the perspectives of internal cooperation coordination and external subsidy incentives within the low-carbon supply chain,taking into account information asymmetry and carbon emission externalities.It constructs and analyzes the equilibrium strategies and influencing factors of a bilateral moral hazard model for LC-CSCs,deriving the optimal“cooperation coordination contract”within LC-CSCs.In response to market failures,two governmental subsidy incentive mechanisms—pre-subsidy and post-subsidy—are designed,with specific scenarios provided for each,thereby optimizing the external“subsidy incentive mechanism”for LC-CSCs.The paper also validates the model's effectiveness through numerical analysis using data from pilot carbon trading cities in China.The study elucidates that cost synergies,carbon pricing,and consumers'preferences for low-carbon options substantially motivate LC-CSC members to reduce emissions.However,“opportunistic behaviors”induced by moral hazard among members can undermine these efforts.In such scenarios,implementing a“cooperation coordination contrac

关 键 词：低碳合作供应链 成本协同效应 双边道德风险 协调契约 补贴激励 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F812.45[经济管理—国民经济]