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作 者:郑月龙[1,2] 刘思漫 白春光 张月月 ZHENG Yuelong;LIU Siman;BAI Chunguang;ZHANG Yueyue(School of Business Administration,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China;School of Literature and Journalism,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)
机构地区:[1]重庆工商大学工商管理学院,重庆400067 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731 [3]重庆工商大学文学与新闻学院,重庆400067
出 处:《运筹与管理》2024年第7期112-118,共7页Operations Research and Management Science
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BJY005);重庆市自然科学基金面上项目(CSTB2024NSCQ-MSX0346);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072021);重庆市教委人文社科研究项目(24SKJD118)。
摘 要:引入信息技术支持,将龙头企业、高校院所及政府构成的共性技术跨组织合作研发分为产出导向与过程导向情形,运用微分博弈分析两种情形下主体决策、收益及影响因素。研究发现:两种情形下产出弹性增量较小(大)时,龙头企业与高校院所研发努力水平与收益系数正(负)相关,与双方努力成本系数及技术淘汰率负(正)相关,监控成本的影响与此类似;收益系数较大(小)时,双方努力水平与产出弹性及其增量正(负)相关;产出弹性增量较小时,双方努力水平和研发收益在产出导向情形更大,反之需考虑监控成本与高校院所努力成本系数的比值;成本补贴系数在过程导向情形下更小,当产出弹性增量较小或较大时政府收益在产出导向情形下更高,否则过程导向情形更高。The characteristics of quasi-public goods of general purpose technologies determine that their R&D has the characteristics of long period,continuous input,knowledge spillover and income uncertainty,etc.,which make general purpose technologies easy to fall into failure dilemmas of insufficient R&D,and cross-organizational cooperation becomes an important organization mode to alleviate the failure dilemmas of general purpose technologies R&D.The previous researches have confirmed the effectiveness of general purpose technologies cooperative R&D using empirical and modeling methods,but there has been little focus on the impact on benefit distribution and payment structures.Therefore,with the support of information technology,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the dynamic game and payment structure selection among participants in the cross-organizational cooperative R&D for general purpose technologies.This paper introduces a cost payment structure where R&D effort levels can be monitored with information technology support,categorizing general purpose technologies cross-organizational R&D scenarios into output-oriented and process-oriented ones.By establishing a differential game model involving leading enterprises,universities and research institutes,and the government,the paper comparatively analyzes the optimal decisions of leading enterprises and universities and research institutes,the R&D system benefits,and the optimal government support strategies under the two R&D scenarios,and explores the selection of two R&D scenarios and their influencing factors.The research results show that:(1)Under both R&D scenarios,when the incremental elasticity of output is small(large),the R&D effort levels and benefit impact coefficients of leading enterprises and universities/research institutes will be positively(negatively)correlated with each other,and negatively(positively)correlated with their R&D effort cost coefficients and technology obsolescence rates,with a similar impact from monitoring
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