非命题意向性:弥补命题主义解释缺失的一种尝试  

Non Propositional Intentionality:An Attempt to Make up for the Defects of Propositional Interpretation

作　　者：贺沙 HE Sha(School of Marxism,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China)

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学马克思主义学院,湖北武汉430079

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2024年第3期24-29,共6页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(19BZX105)。

摘　　要：命题主义一直以来是西方心灵哲学中意向性研究的主流,人们倾向于仅用命题来描述意向性现象。大多数学者将意向性研究还原为命题研究,以至于在通常情况下“意向态度”和“命题态度”能被人们互换使用。当哲学家聚焦于意向性和现象学如何与意识知觉、意识思维和意识情感相联系等问题时,用命题主义的方式解释这些问题往往力有不逮,非命题应运而生。非命题反对将所有的意向性还原为命题的命题主义观点,指出命题描述不能够合理涵盖所有的意向性现象。随着当代认知科学的发展,心灵哲学视域下意向性研究已经出现了明显的非命题主义转向。非命题意向性以命题主义的研究成果为指向,向语言、感知觉、注意、知识表征等方面扩张,试图描绘不同思维类型的轮廓,填补命题主义的解释缺陷。Propositionalism has always been the mainstream of intentionality research in western philosophy of mind,and people tend to describe intentionality only with propositions.Most scholars revert intentionality research to proposition research,so that“intentional attitude”and“proposition attitude”can be used interchangeably under normal circumstances.When philosophers focus on how intentionality and phenomenology are related to conscious perception,conscious thinking and conscious emotion,it is often too weak to explain these problems by propositionalism,and non-proposition arises at the historic moment.Non-proposition opposes the propositional view that all intentionality is reduced to proposition,and points out that proposition description cannot reasonably cover all intentionality phenomena.With the development of contemporary cognitive science,the study of intentionality from the perspective of philosophy of mind has shown an obvious non-propositional turn.Non-propositional intentionality is directed by the research results of propositionalism,and expands to language,perception,attention,knowledge representation and other aspects,trying to describe the outline of different thinking types and fill the explanation defects of propositionalism.

关 键 词：非命题 意向性 心理状态 命题主义 

分 类 号：N941[自然科学总论—系统科学] B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]