不对等权力结构下竞争性闭环供应链的回收模式选择均衡  

Collection mode selection equilibrium for competitive closed-loop supply chains with unequal power

作　　者：孙浩[1] 马晨园 隋玉颖 达庆利[2] SUN Hao;MA Chenyuan;SUI Yuying;DA Qingli(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China;School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2024年第9期3388-3405,共18页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71974104,71971210);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(17YJC630130)。

摘　　要：针对两条具有不对等权力的竞争性闭环供应链,其中双链制造商均可选择己方回收(M模式)、委托零售商回收(R模式)或第三方回收(T模式)的3种模式之一,首先建立和求解博弈模型得到9种可能回收组合下的均衡解、成员利润和链利润,然后基于不同组合的比较推导双链回收模式选择的均衡策略,最后分析均衡组合的Pareto效率。结论表明:①主从链博弈存在“后动优势”现象,特别当从链回收者的回收效率不劣于主链时,从链的各项运营指标完全优于主链;②当从链回收模式任意给定时,无论双链竞争强度如何,主链制造商选择R模式对己方、零售商和整条链最有利;当主链回收模式给定时,随着竞争加剧,M模式、R模式和T模式将依次成为从链制造商和整条从链的最优选择;③RR、RM和RT三种组合均可能是双链的回收模式选择均衡,但在某些条件下RR和RM会陷入低效的囚徒困境。For two competitive closed-loop supply chains with unequal market power,in which both manufacturers of two chains can choose one of three modes:manufacturer-collection(M Mode),retailer-collection(R Mode)and third-party-collection(T Mode).The game models were established and solved to obtain the equilibrium solutions,members’profits and chains’profits under nine possible collection combinations.Based on comparisons of different combinations,the equilibrium strategies of two chains’collection mode selection game were derived.Finally,the Pareto efficiencies of equilibrium combinations were analyzed.The conclusions showed that:①there existed the phenomenon of“second-mover advantage”in leader-follower chain games,particularly when the collection efficiency of the collection party in the follower chain was not inferior to the leader chain,the performance indexes of the follower chain were completely superior to those of the leader chain;②when the collection mode of the follower chain was given arbitrarily,regardless of the competition intensity of two chains,the leader chain’s manufacturer choosing R mode was best for itself,retailer and the whole chain;when the collection mode of the leader chain was given,R mode,M mode and T mode would become the best choice for the follower chain’s manufacturer and the whole follower chain as the competition between two chains intensifies;③RR,RM and RT might be equilibrium combinations of two chains’collection mode selection game,but RR and RM might fall into inefficient prisoner's dilemma under certain conditions.

关 键 词：不对等权力 竞争性闭环供应链 回收模式 均衡策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F713.2[经济管理—国民经济]