社保基金持股与公司违规  

Social Security Fund and Corporate Fraud

作　　者：权小锋 高怡澜 QUAN Xiaofeng;GAO Yilan

机构地区：[1]苏州大学商学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2024年第5期42-56,共15页Finance Research

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2024SJZD05)。

摘　　要：社保基金作为重要的机构投资者,其能否对上市公司发挥治理效应有待实证检验。本文以2007~2023年A股非金融类上市公司作为样本,考察社保基金持股对公司违规的影响及其机理。研究发现:社保基金持股能够显著抑制公司违规,该结论在一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。并且,社保基金持股对公司违规的抑制作用在内部控制质量低、信息透明度低、产品市场竞争激烈的公司中更加显著。机制检验发现,社保基金持股主要通过治理渠道和信息渠道抑制公司违规。本文的研究不仅揭示了社保基金持股对完善公司治理的积极作用,也证实了引导社保基金入市的现实价值。As an important institutional investor,whether the Social Security Fund(SSF)can exert governance effects on listed companies requires empirical testing.This paper uses non-financial A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2023 as samples to examine the impact of SSF holdings on corporate fraud and the underlying mechanisms.The study finds that the SsF holdings can significantly curb corporate fraud,and this conclusion remains robust after a series of robustness tests.Furthermore,the inhibitory effect of SSF holdings on corporate fraud is more pronounced in firms characterized by lower internal control quality,lower information transparency,and heightened product market competition.Mechanism tests indicate that SSF holdings primarily curb corporate fraud through governance channels and information channels.This study not only reveals the positive role of SSF holdings in improving corporate governance but also confirms the practical value of guiding the SSF into the market.

关 键 词：社保基金 公司违规 机构投资者 公司治理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]