科创平台服务供应链定价策略——平台“烧钱”还是引流联盟?  

Pricing strategy for the service supply chain of S&T innovation platforms: Platform “burning money” or piggybacking alliance?

作　　者：谢家平 张广思[1,2] 胡强 梁玲 孔令丞[2,5] XIE Jia-ping;ZHANG Guang-si;HU Qiang;LIANG Ling;KONG Ling-cheng(College of Business,Shanghai University of Finance&Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Business Administration,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830012,China;Shanghai University of Finance&Economics Zhejiang College,Jinhua 321013,China;School of Management,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics,Shanghai 201620,China;School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学商学院,上海200433 [2]新疆财经大学工商管理学院(MBA学院),乌鲁木齐830012 [3]上海财经大学浙江学院,金华321013 [4]上海对外经贸大学工商管理学院,上海201620 [5]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2024年第8期23-45,共23页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(20&ZD060);新疆维吾尔自治区自然科学基金资助项目(2022D01B119);新疆维吾尔自治区普通高校人文社科重点研究基地资助项目(XJEDU2022P072)。

摘　　要：创新驱动发展时代背景下,如何借助平台供应链盘活社会资源为创新提供资源共享的配套服务,以市场化运作实现科创资源的有效利用,对于科创平台和经济社会的意义重大.科创平台上科创资源提供者的配套服务水平高低不但影响其创新产出而且也影响加入平台的用户数量.本研究结合中国科创的现实情境,考虑科研用户对平台上资源提供者配套服务质量存在偏好的情景,运用博弈决策思想研究科创平台的定价决策,进而在普通定价策略基础上重点拓展研究平台补贴和引流联盟两种策略,基于平台双边用户的供给和需求特点的现实情境揭示不同成本类型的科创平台利润最大化策略.研究发现三种策略下单位运营成本在一定范围内平台向资源提供者支付佣金返点,且佣金返点随用户质量偏好的增加而增加,最优补贴金额、引流数量也随之增加;比较三种策略,平台服务收费在平台补贴策略下最低,在引流联盟策略下最高,这两种策略均能在一定条件下为平台带来更高收益;不同成本类型的科创平台在市场中高质量资源提供者占比不同的情形下,应选择不同定价策略才有利于平台利润最大化.此外,考虑创新风险性特点后,需要更高的质量偏好才能实现科创平台利润的大幅度增长.In the era of innovation-driven development,it is of great significance to the S&T innovation platform and social economy to provide supporting services for resource sharing for innovation and to realize the effective use of scientific and technological innovation resources through the platform supply chain,thereby revitalizing social resources.The level of supporting services provided by science and technology resource providers on the S&T innovation platform not only affects their innovation output,but also affects the number of users who join the platform.Considering the actual situation of China’s science and technology innovation,this paper examines the preference of scientific research for the quality of the supporting services provided by resource providers on the platform.Game theory is applied to studying the pricing decisions of the S&T innovation platform.Two strategies,platform subsidies and piggybacking alliances,are extensively examinedbased on ordinary pricing strategies.Based on the realistic situation of the supply and demand characteristics of users on both sides of the platform,the profit maximization strategies of different types of S&T innovation platforms are revealed.The research has found that under the three strategies,the platform pays commission to resource providers within a certain range of unit operating costs.The commission increases with the increase of user quality preference coefficient,and the optimal subsidy amount and drainage quantity also increase.Comparing the three strategies,the service fee of the platform is the lowest under SS and the highest under AS,both of which can bring higher returns to the platform under certain conditions.Different types of S&T innovation platforms should choose different pricing strategies to maximize platform profits when the proportion of high-quality resource providers in the market is different.In addition,after considering the characteristics of innovation risk,a higher quality preference coefficient is required to achieve a substantial

关 键 词：科创平台 平台供应链 平台补贴 企业联盟 引流策略 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]