论彼得·辛格“命主”的理论困境  

On the Theoretical Dilemma of Peter Singer’s“Person”

作　　者：郑绍珉 陈梦瑶 ZHENG Shaomin;CHEN Mengyao(Instituteof Moral Culture,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,Hunan,China;School of History and Culture,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,Hunan,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学道德文化研究院,湖南长沙410081 [2]湖南师范大学历史文化学院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《安康学院学报》2024年第5期59-63,92,共6页Journal of Ankang University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国传统动物伦理思想研究”(20BZX118)。

摘　　要：彼得·辛格的伦理思想是当代物种平等思想的一道标杆,“命主”是其中为反物种主义思想辩护的重要概念,但是该概念却存在巨大争议。通过对这一概念的分析与批判,可以看到其面临与物种平等理论实践相矛盾、与辛格自身理论体系相矛盾和概念建构本身被质疑的理论困境,这些困境意味着命主概念难以融贯地存在于其物种平等思想之中。而通过对命主与物种平等思想的再审视可以发现命主概念的建构不仅是失败的,也是没有必要的,摒弃命主概念才能更好地保证辛格物种平等思想的前后一贯性。Singer’s ethical thought is a benchmark of contemporary species equality thought,and“person”is an important concept to defend anti-speciesism thought.However,this concept has great controversy.The analysis and criticism of this concept can see that it is faced with the theoretical dilemma of contradiction with the practice of species equality theory,contradiction with Singer’s own theoretical system,and the concept construction itself is questioned.These dilemmas mean that the concept of fate is difficult to harmoniously exist in his thought of species equality.By rethinking the thought of the equality between the imperative and species,we can find that the construction of the concept of the imperative is not only a failure,but also unnecessary.Only by abandoning it can we better ensure the consistency of Singer’s thought of the equality of species.

关 键 词：彼得·辛格 命主 反物种主义 平等考虑 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]