考虑政府补贴双渠道三级电子设备产业供应链微分博弈策略研究  

Research on Differential Game Strategy of Dual-channel and Three-level Electronic Equipment Industry Supply Chain under Government Subsidies

作　　者：王森 李明慧[2] Wang Sen;Li Minghui

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学信息管理学院 [2]河南交通职业技术学院

出　　处：《工程经济》2024年第7期18-32,共15页ENGINEERING ECONOMY

基　　金：河南省高等学校重点科研项目:双碳视角下基于微分博弈的三级生鲜供应链决策与契约研究(24A630010)。

摘　　要：考虑减排量和品牌商誉的动态性,构建由供应商、制造商及零售商组成的双渠道三级电子设备产业供应链网络,引入政府补贴利用微分博弈理论研究不同情形下供应链成员及政府的最优均衡策略。理论与算例结果表明:政府补贴能够对供应链利润分配进行调节,且补贴比率受成员利润情况和博弈地位的双重影响;在一定条件下消费者对线上渠道的偏好有利于供应链整体利润的提升,但并不利于零售商的相关工作。Considering the dynamics of emission reduction and brand goodwill,we construct a three-level supply chain network in the electronic equipment industry consisting of suppliers,manufacturers and retailers,and introduce government subsidies to study the optimal equilibrium strategies of supply chain members and the government under different circumstances using differential game theory.The theoretical and example results show that government subsidies can regulate the profit distribution of the supply chain,and the subsidy rate is affected by both the profit situation of the members and the position of the game;under certain conditions,consumers’preference for online channels is beneficial to the improvement of the overall profit of the supply chain,but is not conducive to the retailers'related work.

关 键 词：双渠道三级电子设备产业供应链 减排量 品牌商誉 政府补贴 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F426.6[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32