控制权转让场景下的表决权委托与企业绩效  

Shareholder Voting Rights Delegation in Control Rights Transfer Scenarios and Corporate Performance

作　　者：李邈 郑志刚[2] Li Miao;Zheng Zhigang(School of Accounting,Capital University of Economics and Business;School of Finance,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院 [2]中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2024年第10期189-203,共15页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“表决权委托与投资者权益保护:基于中国A股上市公司的证据”(基金号:72302164)、面上项目“金字塔控股结构下的公司治理效应传导机制研究”(基金号:72372154);首都经济贸易大学新入职青年教师科研启动基金项目(XRZ2023043)的资助。

摘　　要：近年来,资本市场中的一些上市公司股东将表决权委托给收购方以转让控制权,最终形成控制权向实际控制人倾斜的股权结构。然而,股东委托表决权的动机和影响仍未得到充分认识。本文从信息不对称角度出发,利用2015年至2021年间A股市场中发生过控制权转让的上市公司样本,实证考察了表决权委托的形成动因及对企业绩效的影响和路径。研究表明,缓解控制权交易中双方的信息不对称问题是表决权委托签署的潜在动因。表决权委托实现了交易双方的正向利益绑定,促使委托方加强信息传递和沟通,进而缓解管理层人员流失,促进创新产出,最终改善企业长期绩效。拓展性研究表明,受托方可能存在“隧道挖掘”行为,且在提前约定受限股份的后续转让时更为严重,而内外部治理机制的加强则有利于缓解这一负面问题。本文拓展了股东投票权协议、控制权变更和投资者权益保护等领域的现有研究,并为强化信息披露监管、防范表决权委托的道德风险提供有益参考。In recent years,some shareholders of listed companies in capital markets have delegated their voting rights to acquirers to transfer control rights,ultimately resulting in an ownership structure tilted towards the actual controller.However,the motivations and impacts of voting rights delegation have not yet been fully understood.This paper,based on the perspective of information asymmetry and using a sample of companies from the A-share market that experienced control transfers between 2015 and 2021,empirically examines the driving factors behind voting rights delegation,its impact on corporate performance,and the mechanisms through which this influence occurs.The findings indicate that alleviating information asymmetry between the parties in control transactions is a potential motivation for the signing of voting rights delegation.It establishes positive interest alignment between both parties,encouraging the delegating party to enhance information transmission and communication,thereby mitigating the loss of management personnel,promoting innovation output,and ultimately improving longterm corporate performance.Extended research suggests that the delegated party may engage in"tunneling"activities,particularly in cases where subsequent transfers of restricted shares are pre-agreed upon.Strengthening internal and external governance mechanisms helps mitigate this negative issue.This study expands upon existing research in the fields of shareholder voting agreements,control transfers,and investor protection,providing valuable insights for enhancing information disclosure regulation and preventing the moral hazards associated with voting rights delegation.

关 键 词：表决权委托 企业绩效 信息不对称 控制权转让 投资者权益保护 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]