从“先验的主体间性”到“共在”——胡塞尔与早期海德格尔对社会存在论的先验阐释  

From“Transcendental Intersubjectivity”to“Being-with”:Husserl’s and Early Heidegger’s Transcendental Interpretations of Social Ontology

作　　者：王志涵 WANG Zhi-han(Department of Philosophy,Sun Yat-Sen University,Zhuhai 519082)

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系,广东珠海519082

出　　处：《阴山学刊》2024年第5期43-49,共7页Yinshan Academic Journal

摘　　要：早期海德格尔认为“在世界之中存在”的此在必然已经包含与他人的关系,即与他人“共在”,这样一种观点与胡塞尔的先验的主体间性理论相呼应,他们共同认为,自我与他人的主体间关系存在于我们与世界或超越的关系之中。其中胡塞尔将超越理解为与主体相对的客观的真实性、确定性;而海德格尔则认为,此在与世界本身就在超越之中,超越意味着此在对于世界的超越,同时也是使得意向性成为可能的关系性整体,其自身带有不可简化的社会维度。虽然他们对于世界和超越的理解存在着分歧,但是这样一种对于社会性所做的先验(transcendental)①说明是胡塞尔与早期海德格尔所共同秉持的方法,并且在此基础上影响了他们各自哲学中所蕴含的社会存在论的观点。The early Heidegger think that Dasein of“being in the world”necessarily includes a relationship with others,that is“Mitsein”.Such a view echoes Husserl’s transcendental theory of intersubjectivity,in which they share the view that the intersubjective relation between the self and the other exists in our relation to the“world”or“transcedence”.Husserl understands transcendence as objective reality,certainty.As opposed to the subject,Heidegger argues that Dasein and the world are themselves in transcendence,that transcendence implies the overpass of the entity over the world,and that it is also the relational whole that makes intentionality possible,with its own non-reducible social dimension.Although their understandings of“world”and“transcendence”differ,such a transcendental account of sociality is an approach shared by both Husserl and early Heidegger,and on this basis influenced the social ontology perspective embedded in their respective philosophies.

关 键 词：胡塞尔 海德格尔 先验的 主体间性 世界 超越 社会存在论 

分 类 号：B086[哲学宗教—哲学理论]