Coping strategy of independent directors for job-fulfillment risk under different ownership types and enforced legal environments  

作　　者：Yu Xin Ying Xin Xinyi Huang Liping Xu 

机构地区：[1]School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,China [2]School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou,China

出　　处：《China Journal of Accounting Research》2024年第4期112-142,共31页中国会计学刊（英文版）

基　　金：support of the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation(Grant No.2023A1515010802);the Guangdong Province Universities and Colleges Pearl River Scholar Funded Scheme 2019 and the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC Grant No.72132010)。

摘　　要：Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.

关 键 词：New Securities Law Ownership type Regulatory compliance risk Independent directors Job-fulfillment risk 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51