高管薪酬粘性对企业盈余管理偏好的影响研究  

Influence of Executive Compensation Stickiness on Firms'Earnings Management Preference

作　　者：王乐莹 WANG Leying(School of Economics,Bohai University,Jinzhou 121000,China)

机构地区：[1]渤海大学经济学院,辽宁锦州121000

出　　处：《商业观察》2024年第27期86-92,共7页BUSINESS OBSERVATION

摘　　要：高质量的信息披露是公司高效运作的保证,既可以为公司决策提供精确的数据支持,又有助于管理效率的提高。因此文章从盈余管理的薪酬契约动机出发,以2014—2022年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,分类型考察了高管薪酬粘性对企业盈余管理偏好的影响效应。研究结果发现:具有粘性特征的“奖优奖劣”型薪酬契约对盈余平滑度具有显著的促进作用,对盈余激进度也具有显著促进作用,而“奖优罚劣”型薪酬契约抑制盈余平滑度与盈余激进度没有显著关系。这一发现有助于增强企业、政府及相关监管部门对盈余管理偏好的认识,加强公司薪酬激励治理,从而提升企业可持续盈利能力。High-quality information disclosure is the guarantee of the efficient operation of the company,which can not only provide accurate data support for the company's decision-making,but also help to improve the management efficiency.Therefore,starting from the motivations of compensation contract of earnings management,this paper takes China's A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2022 as a research sample to investigate the influence of executive compensation stickiness on corporate earnings management preference.The results show that the"rewarding the good and rewarding the inferior"type of remuneration contract with sticky characteristics has a significant effect on the smoothness of earnings and also has a significant effect on the aggressiveness of earnings,while the"rewarding the good and punishing the inferior"type of compensation contract inhibits the smoothness of earnings,which has no significant relationship with the aggressiveness of earnings.This finding can help to enhance the understanding of earnings management preferences among enterprises,governments and relevant regulatory authorities,strengthen the governance of corporate compensation incentives,and promote sustainable profitability of enterprises.

关 键 词：高管薪酬粘性 盈余平滑度 盈余激进度 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]