特殊的“内部人”——多个大股东并存对管理层业绩预告的影响研究  

Special insiders-research on the impact of multiple large shareholders on management earnings forecasts

作　　者：孙泽宇 常钰苑 董春晖 SUN Zeyu;CHANG Yuyuan;DONG Chunhui(School of Management,Xi′an Jiaotong University,Xi′an 710049,China;School of Business Adminstration,South China Univeristy of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第6期58-71,共14页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(22YJC630004);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目-青年基金项目(GD22YGL15);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目-区域联合基金-青年基金项目(2022A1515110425)。

摘　　要：以管理层业绩预告为代表的自愿性信息披露在改善信息环境、引导投资者预期以及稳定资本市场等方面具有重要意义,但我国资本市场业绩预告披露状况并不乐观。本文立足股权结构这一独特视角,系统探讨了多个大股东并存对管理层业绩预告质量的影响。研究发现,相较于仅存单一控股股东的公司,多个大股东并存从发布意愿、频率与精度三个层面有效改善了管理层业绩预告质量。机制检验表明,多个大股东并存通过增加监督意愿与强化监督能力影响管理层业绩预告质量。异质性分析发现,多个大股东并存对管理层业绩预告质量所产生的影响在非国有企业与经济政策不确定性较大的样本中更显著。同时,以民营及机构股东为代表的非控股大股东在改善管理层业绩预告质量中发挥了主要作用,且非控股大股东类型越丰富,越有助于改善管理层业绩预告质量。本文不仅为有效提升资本市场自愿性信息披露质量提供了可行之策,还对深化上市公司股权多元化改革形成了有益启发。Access to information is essential for the efficient functioning of capital markets.Providing timely and accurate information not only helps companies address internal and external information gaps but also guides investors in forming rational expectations and promotes long-term stability in capital markets.Voluntary information disclosure by companies,such as management earnings forecasts,is considered necessary for shaping the overall information environment of capital markets.China′s capital market has established a semimandatory system for disclosing management earnings forecasts in the past 30 years.However,the outlook regarding voluntary earnings forecast disclosure is not optimistic as it faces challenges such as low willingness,frequency of disclosure and poor quality.Therefore,it is crucial to conduct a systematic study of the factors that affect the quality of management earnings forecasts in China′s capital market.This study can help improve the quality of voluntary information disclosure and facilitate the modernization of corporate governance capabilities and systems for listed companies.In the long term,listed companies in China suffer from the structural issue of“one-share dominance,”in which controlling shareholders have absolute decision-making power in corporate governance.This has led to several inefficient governance practices.Consequently,scholars have focused on the potential impact of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on corporate governance.Against this background,our study examines the influence and the underlying mechanisms of various large shareholders on the quality of earnings forecasts.Theoretically,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders can affect the quality of management earnings forecasts.On the one hand,the presence of numerous large shareholders can be beneficial for a company′s internal governance and management earnings forecasts.First,unlike publicly listed companies with a single controlling shareholder,the presence of multiple large sharehold

关 键 词：多个大股东 管理层业绩预告 自愿性信息披露 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]