碳税政策下考虑双寡头竞争的再制造决策研究  

Research on remanufacturing decision considering duopoly competition under the carbon tax policy

作　　者：缪朝炜[1] 上官莉莉 许舒婷 檀哲 朱荣景 MIAO Zhaowei;SHANG-GUAN Lili;XU Shuting;TAN Zhe;ZHU Rongjing(School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China;School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China;School of Economics and Management,Xiamen University of Technology,Xiamen 361024,China;Digital Fujian Institute of Big Data in Public Security,Fu Jian Police College,Fuzhou 350007,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084 [3]厦门理工学院经济与管理学院,福建厦门361024 [4]福建警察学院数字福建社会安全大数据研究所,福建福州350007

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第6期187-200,共14页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72271208、71671151);福建省自然科学基金项目(2021J05263)。

摘　　要：本文构建了双寡头垄断竞争市场中两家制造商的斯坦克尔博格博弈模型。其中一家企业(厂商)作为领导者,同时生产新产品和再制造品,另外一家企业(竞争者)作为追随者,只生产新产品。本文分别研究了在无碳税和有碳税情况下两家企业的生产决策问题,得到厂商选择再制造的条件,并分别从实施碳税和再制造策略两个角度对模型结果进行分析比较。结果表明:实施碳税有助于降低碳总排放量;合理的碳税可以鼓励厂商采取再制造策略;碳税情况下厂商再制造带来的利润提升以及碳排放量改善绩效是否优于无碳税情况主要受其再制造成本特点的影响。本文进一步构建了竞争者作为领导者、厂商作为追随者的博弈拓展模型,不同博弈模型的比较结果表明:当生产成本较高的一方作为市场中的领导者时,环境绩效能够得到提升;此外,高碳税会削弱领导者的成本优势和先动优势。In recent years,with the rapid development of technology,the update of products is faster than ever before,which results in the problems of global warming and climate change.Therefore,many countries pay more attention to strengthening the supervision of carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions by introducing relevant regulations,such as carbon tax policies.To cope with the strict regulations on carbon dioxide emissions,remanufacturing is becoming an attractive production strategy for many firms.Remanufacturing can bring numerous benefits,such as reducing material costs and unit carbon emissions,expanding market shares and improving environmental performance and economic gains.At present,there are many studies related to remanufacturing and carbon tax policy.By reviewing the related literature,this paper provides support for the idea that a firm′s choice of remanufacturing strategy and production decisions under the carbon tax policy are worth studying in a competitive market.However,most of the literature related to remanufacturing ignores the competition between new products and the power structure among firms.To fill these gaps,this paper uses a Stackelberg game model to investigate the problem of remanufacturing strategy in a duopoly market.There are two firms in a competitive market:One firm(manufacturer)that acts as the leader can produce new product and remanufactured product simultaneously,and the other firm(competitor)that acts as a follower only has the capacity to produce new product.Based on the background of carbon tax policy,this paper mainly considers how to make the optimal production decision and implement the remanufacturing strategy with the purpose of maximizing profit for firms in a competitive market.First,this paper investigates the manufacturer′s remanufacturing strategy choice and the two firms′production and pricing decisions in the benchmark model without the carbon tax policy and the MC model with the carbon tax policy.Then,this paper compares and analyzes the equilibrium results of the two d

关 键 词：可持续性 再制造 碳税 环境绩效 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]