政府会计监督与公司关联交易行为——基于财政部会计信息质量随机检查的经验证据  

Government Accounting Supervision and Corporate Related Party Transactions——Empirical Evidence Based on Random Inspections of Accounting Information Quality of the Ministry of Finance

作　　者：洪金明 李英 HONG Jin-ming;LI Ying(Research Center for Financing and Accounting,Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142;Teaching and Research Center,Beijing National Accounting Institute,Beijing 100191,China)

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院财务与会计研究中心,北京100142 [2]北京国家会计学院教研中心,北京100191

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2024年第10期113-126,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家统计局优选项目(2023LY022)。

摘　　要：通过手工收集1999—2022年财政部会计信息质量随机检查公告披露的沪深A股上市公司数据,考察政府会计监督对关联交易行为的影响。研究发现:财政部会计信息质量随机检查可以显著降低公司关联交易水平;会计信息质量随机检查对公司关联交易的抑制作用在地区法治水平较低、分析师关注度较低、两权分离度较高的公司中表现得更明显;会计信息质量随机检查可以抑制买方关联交易、商品类关联交易和异常关联交易。研究结论有助于进一步完善政府会计监督制度,加强关联交易治理。By manually collecting data from announcements of random inspections of accounting information quality of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen conducted by the Ministry of Finance from 1999 to 2022,this study examined the impact of government accounting supervision on related party transactions.The research found that random inspections of accounting information quality by the Ministry of Finance could significantly reduce the level of related party transactions in companies.The inhibitory effect of these inspections on related party transactions was more pronounced in companies located in regions with lower levels of legal system development,lower analyst attention,and higher separation of ownership and control.Additionally,the inspections could curb buyer-related transactions,commodity-related transactions,and abnormal related party transactions.The conclusions of this study could help to further improve government accounting supervision systems and strengthen the governance of related party transactions.

关 键 词：政府会计监督 关联交易 内部控制缺陷 控股股东利益侵占 管理层自利 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]