政府采购与公司避税:政治压力还是监督治理?  

Government Procurement and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Political Pressure or Supervisory Governance?

作　　者：刘启亮[1] 田志凡 陈冬[3] 高尚 Liu Qiliang

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,330013 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,430074 [3]武汉大学经济与管理学院,430072

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第6期70-86,共17页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772139和72372061);教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(22YJA790004)的资助。

摘　　要：政府采购流程自身所伴生的监督治理作用是否会抑制供应商的避税行为呢(即“监督治理假说”)基于此,本文以2015-2019年A股上市公司为样本,研究发现获得政府采购的公司,无论政府采购金额大小,都会减少避税。而且,公开招标的采购以及单独中标的供应商更会减少避税。机制分析发现,政府采购通过提升公司的内部治理水平和外部监督强度发挥了对公司避税的监督治理作用。本文的发现拓展了政府采购与公司避税领域的研究,为完善政府采购制度提供了直接的经验证据。Does the supervision and govemance role inherent in the govermment procurement process inhibit suppliers'tax avoidance activities(i.e.,the"supervisory governance hypothesis")?Based on a sample of A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019,this study finds that companies receiving government procurement contracts tend to reduce tax avoidance,regardless of the procurement amount.Moreover,the negative impact of government procurement on tax avoidance is more pronounced in cases where procurement is conducted through public bidding and for suppliers who win contracts individually.Mechanism analysis reveals that government procurement plays a supervisory and governance role in corporate tax avoidance by enhancing internal corporate governance and strengthening external oversight.These findings extend the research on government procurement and corporate tax avoidance,providing direct empirical evidence for improving government procurement systems.

关 键 词：政府采购 避税 监督治理假说 政治成本假说 

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