融资约束、无形资本与企业创新——来自中国上市企业的经验证据  

Financing Constraint,Intangible Capital and Corporate Innovation-Evidence from Listed Companies in China

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作  者:李晶晶 Li Jingjing(School of Economics,University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区:[1]中国社会科学院大学经济学院

出  处:《调研世界》2024年第11期46-56,共11页The World of Survey and Research

摘  要:融资约束会抑制企业创新行为,这一影响的关键在无形资本。本文基于中国2010—2021年非金融上市企业微观数据,理论分析与实证检验了融资约束如何影响企业创新。创新结构上,融资约束不利于企业创新,也不利于企业渐进式创新和激进式创新。影响渠道上,产生不利影响的原因在于融资约束紧缩了企业无形资本的积累,无形资本是企业开展创新的关键。上述结论经系列稳健性检验后仍成立。异质性分析表明,“超级明星”企业具有创新上的“刚性”;国企与非国企在渐进式创新上存在差异;企业创新决策在不同的去杠杆水平以及不同发展阶段存在显著区别。对此,本文提出要完善金融市场体系,拓宽企业融资渠道;完善企业进入与退出机制;尊重企业创新规律,发挥好政府与市场对企业创新的支持作用。Financing constraint can inhibit corporate innovation mainly through intangible capital.Based on the micro data of non-financial listed companies in China from 2010 to 2021,the paper examines how financing constraint impacts corporate innovation theoretically and empirically.The financing constraint negatively affects both incremental innovation and radical innovation within companies,as it restricts the accumulation of intangible capital which is essential for corporate innovation.The findings hold true after a series of robustness tests.Heterogeneity analysis shows that“superstar companies”are resilient in innovation,state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are different in incremental innovation,and corporate innovation decisions are significantly different with different levels of deleveraging and at different development stages.Finally,it suggests improving the financial market system and broadening corporate financing channels,enhancing the mechanisms for enterprise entry and exit,respecting the law of corporate innovation,and effectively leveraging the supportive roles of both the government and the market in fostering corporate innovation.

关 键 词:融资约束 企业创新 激进式创新 渐进式创新 无形资本 

分 类 号:F273[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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