论费希特早期知识学的自我意识理论  

On the Self-consciousness Theory of Fichte's Early Philosophy

作　　者：张程程 Zhang Chengcheng

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《理论界》2024年第10期51-57,共7页Theory Horizon

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目“合成生物学伦理、政策法规框架研究”(2018YFA0902400)的研究成果。

摘　　要：康德提出了作为人类知识最高原理的先验统觉理论,但限于理性批判的立场没有能够对这一原理进行彻底阐发。为了克服康德哲学所残存的二元论因素,费希特建构起了以绝对自我为基础的知识学体系,企图从纯粹自我意识的自明性出发为人类知识奠基。然而囿于经验意识的对立结构,费希特无法真正实现主客体的原初统一,只能诉诸实践哲学中追求自我与非我统一的无限努力。对此,费希特改进了知识学的表述,通过理智直观的方法突出了自我的行动本质,将意识的对立结构内化于作为行动的自我之中。而这种改进也只是对自身主观唯心论立场的完善,知识学的自我意识理论仍然面临着内在的困难。Kant proposed the theory of transcendental apperception as the supreme principle of human knowledge,but limited to the standpoint of critical philosophy,he could not explain this principle thoroughly.In order to overcome the remaining dualism in Kant's philosophy,Fichte constructed a science of knowledge based on absolute selfhood,trying to lay the foundation of human knowledge through self-enlightenment of pure self-consciousness.However,due to the antithesis structure of experiential consciousness,was unable to truly achieve the original unity between subject and object,and could only strive endlessly for the unity between self and non-self in practical philosophy.In this regard,Fichte refined his expression by emphasizing the agency of self through rational intuition and internalized the conflicting structure of consciousness within oneself as an act.Nevertheless,these improvements merely perfected his own position within subjective idealism,and his self-consciousness theory is still facing internal difficulties.

关 键 词：自我意识 知识学 理智直观 绝对自我 

分 类 号：B1[哲学宗教—世界哲学]