元宇宙与“钵中之脑”:从语义外部论到结构实在论  

The Metaverse and the Brain in a Vat:From Semantic Externalism to Structural Realism

作　　者：陈常燊 CHEN Chang-shen(School of Philosophy,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,Shanxi,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学哲学学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《贵阳学院学报（社会科学版）》2024年第5期53-59,共7页Journal of Guiyang University:Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目“分析的西方哲学史研究”(项目编号:19AZX013);国家社科基金后期资助一般项目“维特根斯坦与寂静主义研究”(项目编号:21FZXB042)。

摘　　要：借助数字化设备,元宇宙将希拉里·普特南的“钵中之脑”,从扶手椅上的一个科幻场景,转变为一项潜力巨大的前沿技术。有关元宇宙的一个前瞻性哲学问题,是虚拟与现实之间的本体论鸿沟是否有可能被消解。借助语义外部论,普特南对此给出了否定的回答。这个回答并不令人满意,它面临着乞题谬误、先验论证谬误、延展心智缺失、不可能知识谬误等批评,因此不但未能真正驳倒语义内部论,而且无助于我们扫清元宇宙技术的形而上学障碍。借鉴尼克·博斯特罗姆的“模拟假说”与大卫·查尔默斯对“元宇宙”与“元-宇宙”的概念区分,本文提出一个替代方案——语义结构实在论。该方案不仅能帮助我们厘清语义外部论方案的合理性及其局限性,它还具有形而上学方面的优势。With the aid of digital devices,the metaverse has transformed Hilary Putnam's thought experience of"Brain in a Vat"from an armchair science fiction scenario into a cutting-edge technology with immense potential.A forwardlooking philosophical question concerning the metaverse is whether the ontological gap between the virtual and the real world can be bridged.Using semantic externalism,Putnam provides a negative answer to this question,which is unsatisfactory because there are criticisms such as the fallacy of petitio principii,the fallacy of transcendental argumentation,the absence of extended mind,and the fallacy of impossible knowledge.Therefore,it not only fails to genuinely refute semantic internalism,but also does not help in clearing the metaphysical obstacles for metaverse technology.Drawing on Nick Bostrom's"simulation hypothesis"and David Chalmers'distinction between the concepts of"metaverse"and"meta-universe,"this paper proposes an alternative approach-structural realism.This approach could not only help clarify the rationality and limitations of the semantic externalism,but is also metaphysically advantageous.

关 键 词：元宇宙 “钵中之脑” 模拟假说 语义外部论 结构实在论 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]