不同权力结构下双渠道供应链的PMG合同定价决策  

PMG Contract Pricing Decision in Dual-channel Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

作　　者：刘斌[1] 曹佳敏 LIU Bin;CAO Jiamin(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science&Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《物流技术》2024年第9期67-78,共12页Logistics Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71971134)。

摘　　要：探讨了在不同权力结构下产品可替代性相对渠道地位对成员签订PMG合同态度的影响,针对性地研究在不对称相对渠道地位下的三种博弈情况(MS-制造商为领导者、VN-纵向纳什和RS-销售商为领导者)供应链成员对领导者地位的偏好、对签订PMG(Profit-Margin-Guarantee)合同的态度以及消费者福利最大问题。研究表明:在制造商处于权力的主导地位时,不签订PMG合同是对制造商有利的。在制造商具有更多权力时,特定情况下签订PMG合同对零售商是有益的。当零售商和制造商具有同等权力时,签订了PMG合同后产品的零售价会降低,而制造商和零售商对签订PMG合同持相反态度,受利润保证率和渠道不对称性的双重影响。制造商和零售商对领导者偏好受产品可替代性和受渠道不对称的影响。当利润保证率过高时,制造商和零售商均无领导者偏好。这些结论为双渠道供应链成员的决策提供了参考和指导。In this paper,we discussed the influence of product substitutability and relative channel position on the attitude of supply chain members towards a profit-margin-guarantee(PMG)contract under different power structures,and paid special attention to three game situations with asymmetric relative channel position,namely manufacturer Stackelberg(MS),vertical Nash(VN)and retailer Stackelberg(RS).These different game scenarios reveal the supply chain members'preference for leader position and their attitude towards the PMG contract,and also involve issues such as maximum consumer benefits,etc.The research results show that a dominating manufacturer is most benefited by not entering into the PMG contract.However,in some specific cases,when enough power is vested to the manufacturer,it may be beneficial for the retailer to enter into the PMG contract.This usually occurs in a highly competitive market environment where consumers are price sensitive.Under such circumstances,the retailer can secure a certain profit margin through the PMG contract and is thus incentivized to actively promote and sell products.When the retailer and the manufacturer are in equal power position,entering into the PMG contract will lead to reduction in the retail price of the product,which reflects the balance of interests between the two parties in contract negotiation.However,the manufacturer and the retailer may have opposing attitudes towards the PMG contract.The manufacturer may be concerned about profit reduction,while the retailer may want to reduce market risk by making profits.Such difference stems in part from the dual effects of fixed profit margin and channel asymmetry.In addition,the research results show that preferences of the manufacturer and the retailer for leader position are influenced by product substitutability and channel asymmetry.If the product is highly substitutable,the retailer may be inclined to choose more favorable contract terms,thereby strengthening its market position.When the fixed profit margin is too high,bot

关 键 词：供应链管理 双渠道 利润率保证合同 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]