代理VS.批发:信息共享对电子书销售模式的影响  

Agency VS.Wholesale:The Effect of Information Sharing on the E-Book Sales Model

作　　者：刘正 石纯来 杜荣[1] LIU Zheng;SHI Chunlai;DU Rong(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi'an 710126)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2024年第10期3025-3039,共15页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171187,72201202);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(22YJC630116);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2022R007);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目(2022JQ-744);中央基本科研业务费资助项目(KYFZ23017)资助课题。

摘　　要：在出版商和零售平台之间需求信息不对称的背景下,通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,探究了零售平台的需求信息共享决策对电子书销售模式策略的影响.研究结果表明:1)批发模式下,零售平台不与出版商共享需求信息,但在代理模式下,若零售平台从电子书渠道获得的佣金比例较高时,零售平台会与出版商共享需求信息.2)就零售平台而言,若零售平台不与出版商共享需求信息,则零售平台偏好批发模式.若仅代理模式下零售平台与出版商共享需求信息,当零售平台对市场需求预测的精准度较低时,零售平台偏好代理模式;否则,偏好批发模式.3)就出版商而言,零售平台的需求信息共享决策、电子书对纸质书的替代率以及零售平台对需求信息预测的精准度均会影响出版商对销售模式的选择.Under the background of asymmetric demand information in a publisher and a retail platform,this paper establishes the Stackelberg game model to explore the impact of the retail platform's demand information sharing decision on the e-book sales model strategy.The main results show that:1)The retail platform does not always share demand information with the publisher under the wholesale model.Under the agency model,if the commission rate from selling e-books is high,the retail platform will share demand information;Otherwise,the retail platform will not share demand information.2)For the retail platform,in cases where the retail platform doesn't share demand information in both agency and wholesale models,the retail platform prefers the wholesale model.In cases where the retail platform shares demand information only in the agency model,if the accuracy of demand information is low,the retail platform prefers the agency model.3)For the publisher,the retail platform's decision to share demand information,the substitution rate of e-books for paper books,and the accuracy of demand information will all affect the publisher's choice of sales model.

关 键 词：需求信息共享 电子书 销售模式 代理模式 批发模式 

分 类 号：G235[文化科学] F274[经济管理—企业管理]