使真者语义下的反事实条件句——基于对前提语义学的辩护  

Counterfactual Conditionals in a Truthmaker Semantics: Based on a Defense of Premise Semantics

作　　者：杜国平[1] 涂美奇 DU Guo-ping;TU Mei-qi

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学哲学院,北京102400

出　　处：《湖北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第6期54-62,164,165,共11页Journal of Hubei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：中国社会科学院创新工程项目“人工智能的逻辑与哲学研究”(2023ZXSCXB03)。

摘　　要：反事实条件句在语义刻画中并不能用解释经典逻辑中的真值函项联结词的方式来解释,其语义解释依赖于语境,并在推理中具有非单调性的特征,同时还要规避“古德曼难题”。这要求语义模型对反事实条件句的刻画要更加细粒化。使真者理论将一个命题为真的原因解释为由客观世界中的特定实体所导致。因此,相比于可能世界语义学,更加细化的使真者语义学在刻画反事实条件句时可以更好地满足非真值函项性、语境依赖、非单调性的要求。使真者语义学中的“理想”构造可以刻画前提语义学中的聚合概念,解决原有前提集会遇到的困难,避免“古德曼难题”,由此为前提语义学提供了辩护,并解释了反事实条件句逻辑中的单调性、等值置换等问题。Counterfactual conditionals cannot be construed in terms of truth-functional connectives of classical logic in semantic representation. They are context-dependent, non-monotonic in reasoning and subject to Goodman s paradox. This requires the semantic model of counterfactual conditionals to be more fine-grained. The truth-maker theory explains why a proposition is true by saying that it is caused by a specific entity in the objective world. Therefore, compared with the possible world semantics, the more fine-grained truth-maker semantics can better satisfy the requirements of non-truth-functionality, context-dependence, and non-monotonicity in the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. The “ideal” construction in the truth-maker semantics can characterize the aggregative concepts in the premise semantics, solve the difficulties encountered by the original premise set, avoid the Goodman s paradox, thereby providing a defense for the premise semantics and explaining the monotonicity, equivalence substitution problems in the logic of counterfactual conditionals.

关 键 词：反事实条件句 使真者语义学 前提语义学 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学] H146.3[语言文字—汉语] H03