员工持股计划实施与高管超额在职消费抑制  

Employee Stock Ownership Plan Implementation and Suppression of Excessive On-the-Job Spending by Executives

作　　者：马超 罗连化 赵海珠 MA Chao;LUO Lianhua;ZHAO Haizhu(School of Finance,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China)

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学金融学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2024年第6期83-95,共13页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“混合所有制改革背景下员工股权激励提升国企治理效率研究”(21CJL023)。

摘　　要：以2014-2019年沪深A股非金融上市企业数据为研究样本,研究了员工持股计划实施对高管超额在职消费行为的影响效应。研究发现,当员工持股比例超过一定水平后,能够通过提升员工稳定性与努力程度的渠道强化员工监督动机,并通过提升员工议价能力与员工之间利益一致性的渠道来提高员工监督能力,从而对高管超额在职消费形成有效抑制。因此,当员工持股比例达到一定水平后,员工持股计划的实施能够实现员工与股东的激励相容,从而成为一种约束高管自利行为的有效公司治理机制。Taking the data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2014 to 2019 as the research sample,we studied the effect of the implementation of employee stock ownership plan on the excessive on-the-job consumption behavior of executives.It is found that when the proportion of employee shareholding exceeds a certain level,it can strengthen employee monitoring motivation through the channel of enhancing employee stability and effort,and improve employee monitoring ability through the channel of enhancing employee bargaining power and the consistency of interests among employees,thus forming an effective inhibition on executive excessive on-the-job consumption.Therefore,when the proportion of employee shareholding reaches a certain level,the implementation of the employee shareholding plan can realize the incentive compatibility between employees and shareholders,thus becoming an effective corporate governance mechanism to restrain the self-interested behavior of executives.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 超额在职消费 激励相容 公司治理作用 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]