“主观权利”概念的重构  

Reconstructing the Concept of Subjective Rights

作　　者：陈帮锋[1] CHEN Bangfeng(Xiamen University Law School)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学法学院

出　　处：《法学家》2024年第6期65-77,190,共14页The Jurist

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“合同法中的免责事由研究”(20BFX115)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：“主观权利”概念有两个面向,一个是主观意识意义上的,另一个则是技术性的。前者使主观权利被界定为自由、意思力等较具心理学意味的事物,而后者则体现为主观权利被主要用来整理私法规则、构建私法体系。主观权利在狄骥、凯尔森等实证主义学者的批判下曾趋于式微,也因学者们意识到该概念本身的局限性而催生了“无主体权利”这个让人困扰的问题,但它已经成为一种习惯性话语和法律人的一种思维定式,而只能抱残守缺。主观权利与客观法并不重叠,主观权利话语并不能完全覆盖客观法,仍留出了一片开阔地,而这片开阔地应由客观法话语来填补。The concept of subjective rights has two aspects,one is subjective consciousness and the other is technical.The former defines subjective rights as more psychologically meaningful things such as freedom and willpower,while the latter is reflected in the use of subjective rights to organize private law rules and construct private law systems.Subjective rights have declined under the criticism of positivist scholars such as Leon Duguit and Hans Kelsen,and scholars have also realized the limitations of the concept of subjective rights,which has given rise to the perplexing problem of"non subject rights".However,it has become a habitual discourse and a thinking pattern for legal professionals,and can only remain incomplete.Subjective rights and objective law do not overlap,and the discourse of subjective rights cannot fully cover objective law.There is still an open space left,which should be filled by the discourse of objective law.

关 键 词：主观权利 客观法 无主体权利 狄骥 凯尔森 

分 类 号：D909.1[政治法律—法学理论]