管理层权力对关键审计事项披露的影响  

The impact of management power on the disclosure of key audit matters

作　　者：梁立珉 Liang Limin(Guangxi University of Science and Technology,Liuzhou,Guangxi,545006)

机构地区：[1]广西科技大学,广西柳州545006

出　　处：《市场周刊》2024年第32期102-105,134,共5页Market Weekly

摘　　要：管理层作为企业经营的重要决策者,其权力的增大会加剧企业风险,因此关键审计事项的披露难免会受到管理层的影响。文章以2017—2021年A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了管理层权力对关键审计事项披露的影响。结果显示,管理层权力与关键审计事项披露充分性显著正相关,审计师选择和企业内部薪酬差距在管理层权力与关键审计事项披露充分性之间分别起正向和负向调节作用。中介机制分析表明,过度自信在管理层权力与关键审计事项披露充分性之间发挥部分中介作用。As an important decision maker of enterprise management,the increase of managements power will aggravate enterprise risks,so the disclosure of key audit matters will inevitably be affected by management.This paper takes A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2021 as the research object,and empirically tests the impact of management power on disclosure of key audit matters.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between management power and disclosure adequacy of key audit matters.Auditor selection and internal pay gap have positive and negative moderating effects between management power and disclosure adequacy of key audit matters,respectively.The mediation mechanism analysis shows that overconfidence plays a partial mediating role between management power and the adequacy of disclosure of key audit matters.

关 键 词：管理层权力 关键审计事项 审计师选择 内部薪酬差距 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]