公平的机会平等原则的优先性:为罗尔斯辩护  

The Priority of Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity:In Defence of Rawls

作　　者：唐鹏远 TANG Pengyuan(School of philosophy,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2024年第5期102-113,共12页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

摘　　要：公平的机会平等原则的优先性是罗尔斯正义理论中的一个疑难问题。罗尔斯既没有在原初状态的推理中为之提出证明,后续也没有进行充足的论证,反而在其后期著作中表示出对这一主张的迟疑态度。为解决这一问题,既需要澄清优先性的性质,也需要说明优先性的理由。优先性的性质既取决于罗尔斯的直接规定(词典式优先),也取决于罗尔斯正义理论的整体性质(理想理论中的优先)。这一澄清回应了词典式优先性会使公平的机会平等原则成为“资源黑洞”的批评。罗尔斯的正义理论中也有为优先性辩护的理论资源。当“自我实现”的概念得到亚里士多德主义原则和社会联合的观念的具体解释后,它能够为优先性提供辩护。如此解释的“自我实现”也能够应对阿内森提出的质疑。The priority of the principle of fair equality of opportunity is a problem in Rawls's theory of justice.Rawls neither presents a proof for it in reasoning from original position nor argues for it elsewhere,but instead expresses hesitation in his later writings.To resolve this problem,it is necessary both to clarify the nature of priority and to justify it.The nature of priority depends both on Rawls's direct prescription(lexical priority)and on the overall nature of Rawls's theory of justice(priority in the ideal theory).This clarification responds to the criticism that lexical priority can turn the principle of fair equality of opportunity into a“black hole of resources”.Rawls's theory of justice also contains theoretical resources to justify priority.The concept of“self-realization”can provide a defense of priority when it is specifically interpreted in terms of Aristotelian principle and the idea of social union.Self-realization,so interpreted,is also able to withstand the powerful challenge raised by Arneson.

关 键 词：公平的机会平等 优先性 自我实现 亚里士多德主义原则 社会联合 

分 类 号：B716.2[哲学宗教—外国哲学]