张岱年与冯友兰之“理”比较——以《新对话》《谭“理”》《新理学》为中心  

A Comparative Study of“Li”Between Zhang Dainian and Feng Youlan——Centered on New Dialogue,O n“Li”,and New Philosophy

作　　者：刘长城 LIU Changcheng(School of Philosophy,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou,Henan 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学哲学学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《衡水学院学报》2024年第6期61-66,75,共7页Journal of Hengshui University

摘　　要：冯友兰《新对话》阐述之“理”为:有某事物必有某事物之理,无某理即无某事物,有某理未必就有某事物;理是共相,具体事物是殊相;理是超时空的绝对。张岱年《谭“理”》不同意冯友兰的看法,他对“理”的概念做了五个方面的梳理,并没有认为理是事物之所以为事物的当然之“则”。冯友兰的《新对话》与《新理学》是源与流的关系,《新对话》之“理”在《新理学》中均有相对应的内容。张岱年《谭“理”》之“理”与冯友兰《新对话》《新理学》之“理”虽有不同却不可截然分开,二者在许多方面殊途同归。Feng Youlan’s New Dialogue expounds the concept of“Li”as follows:the existence of a certain thing necessitates the existence of its corresponding“Li”;the absence of a certain“Li”implies the absence of the corresponding thing;however,the mere presence of“Li”does not guarantee the existence of the corresponding thing.“Li”represents the universal,while specific things are particular instances.“Li”is an absolute concept that transcends time and space.Zhang Dainian,in his essay On“Li”,disagrees with Feng Youlan’s viewpoint.He organizes the concept of“Li”into five aspects and does not consider“Li”to be the inherent“rule”that defines a thing as what it is.Feng Youlan’s New Dialogue and New Philosophy are interconnected,with the“Li”discussed in New Dialogue finding corresponding content in New Philosophy.Although the“Li”in Zhang Dainian’s On“Li”differs from that in Feng Youlan’s New Dialogue and New Philosophy,they cannot be completely separated,as they converge in many aspects.

关 键 词：张岱年 冯友兰 理 《新对话》 《谭“理”》 《新理学》 

分 类 号：B26[哲学宗教—中国哲学]