碳交易政策下绿色技术创新联盟搭便车行为博弈研究  

Game study of green technology innovation alliance hitchhiking behavior under carbon trading policy

作　　者：马子贺 陈培友 MA Zihe;CHEN Peiyou(School of Management,Heilongjiang University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150022,China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江科技大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150022

出　　处：《煤炭经济研究》2024年第9期97-108,共12页Coal Economic Research

摘　　要：绿色技术创新联盟已成为实现“双碳”目标的重要力量,而联盟中搭便车行为却严重影响了绿色技术创新联盟稳定发展。为此,考虑碳交易政策对联盟成员策略选择产生影响,在传统演化博弈基础上引入动态碳价,构建具有随机支付矩阵的演化博弈模型,利用数值仿真分析,探究联盟成员策略行为选择与联盟中搭便车行为的演进过程。结果表明,碳价、监管力度、声誉、创新成功差异等多方因素会影响联盟成员策略选择。最后,在仿真结论基础上,为相关管理者提出针对性建议。Green technology innovation alliance has become an important force to achieve the goal of"double carbon",but the freeriding behavior in the alliance has seriously affected the stable development of green technology innovation alliance.To this end,we consider the impact of carbon trading policy on alliance members"strategy selection,introduce dynamic carbon price on the basis of traditional evolutionary game,construct an evolutionary game model with stochastic payment matrix,and use numerical simulation to explore the evolution of alliance members"strategy selection and free-riding behaviors in the alliance,and the results show that the carbon price,regulatory efforts,reputation,differences in innovation success,and other factors will affect the strategic selection of alliance members.The results show that the carbon price,reputation,innovation success difference and other factors will affect the strategic behavior choice of alliance members,and finally,on the basis of the simulation conclusions,relevant suggestions are proposed for the relevant managers.

关 键 词：碳交易政策 绿色技术创新联盟 几何布朗运动模型 演化博弈 模型参数 数值仿真 碳价路径 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理] F416.21[经济管理—国民经济]