“知之方有二”——“厚实认识论”视域下船山的知识论  

“Knowledge of Two Kinds”——Chuanshan’s Epistemology from the Perspective of “Thick Epistemology”

作　　者：孙钦香[1] SUN Qinxiang(Institute of Philosophy and Cultural Studies,Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences,Nanjing 210004,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏省社会科学院哲学与文化研究所,江苏南京210004

出　　处：《齐鲁学刊》2024年第6期23-31,共9页Qilu Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“多卷本《宋明理学史新编》”(17ZDA013)。

摘　　要：“格物致知”是儒家修身工夫之一,以西方近代主客分离式的认识论来解释之固然是不恰当的,因“格物致知”非“干燥的光”,但也不可否认其中的知识论维度。专就船山“格物致知”而言,借助“厚实认识论”理论,可恰当揭示其在作为“修为之一法”的前提下,关于物的激发性、人的心灵能力的接受性与自发性等知识形上学问题。由此可以说,船山的知识论是在人的生活实践意义上兼顾了理论知识(“学识之知”)与德性自证(“自喻”)知识。As one of the Confucian self-cultivation practices, “Ge Wu Zhi Zhi” is indeed inappropriate to be explained by the Western modern epistemology of subject-object separation. This is because “Ge Wu Zhi Zhi” is not akin to a “dry, abstract light”, yet it is undeniably possesses an epistemological dimension. Specifically regarding Chuanshan’s “Ge Wu Zhi Zhi”, with the assistance of the theory of “Thick Epistemology”, it can properly reveal its metaphysical issues of knowledge such as the excitability of things, the receptivity and spontaneity of human spiritual abilities, under the premise of being “one of the methods of self-cultivation”, thereby explaining that Chuanshan’s epistemology takes into account theoretical knowledge (“knowledge of learning”) and moral self-evidence (“self-representation”) knowledge on the significance of human life practice.

关 键 词：格物致知 厚实认识论 激发性 接受性 自发性 

分 类 号：B249[哲学宗教—中国哲学]