国有资本参股与民营企业独立董事履职  

State-owned Capital Participation and the Independent Directors Performance of Duties

作　　者：钱爱民[1] 张如渝 朱大鹏 QIAN Aimin;ZHANG Ruyu;ZHU Dapeng(Business School,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;School of Accounting,Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029 [2]上海立信会计金融学院会计学院,上海201620

出　　处：《财经论丛》2024年第12期80-91,共12页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：财政部“会计名家培养工程”项目(财会[2019]19号);国家自然科学基金重点项目(72332002);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972134)。

摘　　要：本文以2008—2021年中国A股民营上市公司为样本,研究了国有资本参股对民营企业独立董事履职的影响及作用机制。研究发现:国有资本参股显著增加了民营上市公司独立董事异议发表,说明非控股国有股东能够促进独立董事履职。上述结果在民营上市公司融资约束程度较高、控股股东权力较低、地区政府干预程度较低时更加显著。机制分析表明,国有资本参股通过降低独立董事离任风险和改善企业信息环境有效促进了独立董事履职。进一步考察国有股东异质性特征发现,地方国有股东以及跨行业国有股东对独立董事履职的促进效应更强;此外,国有股东(超额)委派董事可以强化国有资本参股对独立董事履职的促进效应。经济后果检验显示,国有资本参股可以增强独立董事履职的监督效应和价值效应。本文的研究结论对于进一步提高独立董事的治理效果、深化民营企业“反向混改”具有积极的政策启示。This paper uses a sample of Chinese A-share private listed firms from 2008 to 2021 to investigate the impact of state-owned capital participation on independent directors performance of duties in private firms and the underlying mechanism.It is found that state-owned capital participation significantly increases the dissenting statements of independent directors in private listed companies,indicating that non-controlling state-owned shareholders can promote independent directors performance of duties.The above association is more pronounced when the financial constraints of a firm are severer,the power of the controlling shareholder is less,and the intervention level of the government is lower.The mechanism tests reveal that state-owned shareholders improve independent directors performance of duties by reducing directors risk of losing their current board seat and improving firms information environment.Further examination of the heterogeneous characteristics of state-owned shareholders finds that local or cross-industry state-owned shareholders have a stronger promoting effect on independent directors performance.Besides,the(over)appointment of directors by state-owned shareholders can strengthen the promotion effect of state-owned capital on independent directors performance.Finally,the test of economic consequences indicates that state-owned capital participation enhances the monitoring effect and the value-adding effect of independent directors performance.The conclusion of this paper has positive policy implications for further improving the governance effect of independent directors and deepening the reverse mixed-ownership reform of private firms.

关 键 词：国有资本参股 反向混改 独立董事履职 独立董事异议 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]