协同治理视角下乳品质量安全供给复杂网络演化博弈研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game of Dairy Quality and Safety Supply Complex Network from the Perspective of Collaborative Governance

作　　者：郝晓燕 董超 王永梅 HAO Xiaoyan;DONG Chao;WANG Yongmei(School of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia University of Technology,Hohhot Inner Mongolia 010051;Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Higher Education Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences-Inner Mongolia Rural Construction Research Center,Hohhot Inner Mongolia 010051)

机构地区：[1]内蒙古工业大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010051 [2]内蒙古自治区高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地—内蒙古乡村建设研究中心,内蒙古呼和浩特010051

出　　处：《中国乳业》2024年第11期84-95,100,共13页China Dairy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目-协同治理视角下我国乳品安全供给的政府规制与企业自我规制竞合机制(71863027);内蒙古教育厅-党的二十大精神研究·哲学社会科学重大专项-推进中国式现代化的内蒙古乡村建设实践研究(ESDZX202301);内蒙古自治区社会科学基金2023年度项目-内蒙古建设宜居宜业和美乡村的路径和对策研究(2023AY41)。

摘　　要：乳业高质量安全供给需要政府规制、企业自我规制、行业自律等多主体协同治理实现。文章从协同治理的角度出发,构建了多主体乳品质量安全供给的有向复杂网络模型,运用熵值法对复杂网络的关键节点重要度进行了测算;进而构建三方博弈模型,运用复制动态方程分析各方策略和均衡点的稳定性;就三方策略选择的影响关系进行了演化仿真。研究表明:1)复杂网络的关键节点重要度排序为乳品加工企业、政府、媒体、分销商,节点重要度分别为0.223、0.203、0.202、0.186。2)选取乳品加工企业、政府、分销商进行三方演化博弈,博弈与仿真分析结果表明政府监管策略的选择受到监管成本与声誉损失的影响;分销商对乳品加工企业的处罚可在一定程度上约束其生产不合格乳制品的行为;加大政府处罚力度和监管效率,可提高分销商严格评估的积极性以及乳品加工企业生产合格乳制品的动机。The high-quality and safe supply of dairy industry needs the coordinated governance of multiple subjects such as government regulation,enterprise self-regulation and industry self-discipline.From the perspective of collaborative governance,this paper constructs a directed complex network model of multi-agent dairy quality and safety supply,and calculates the importance of key nodes of the complex network by using entropy method;Then,a three-party game model is constructed to analyze the stability of strategies and equilibrium points by using replication dynamic equation;Evolutionary simulation is carried out on the influence relationship of threeparty strategy selection.The research shows that:1)the key nodes of the complex network are dairy processing enterprises,government,media and distributors,and the node importance is 0.223,0.203,0.202 and 0.186 respectively.2)The results of game and simulation analysis show that the choice of government supervision strategy is affected by supervision cost and reputation loss;The punishment of distributors on dairy processing enterprises can restrict their behavior of producing unqualified dairy products to a certain extent;Increasing government punishment and supervision efficiency can improve the enthusiasm of distributors for strict evaluation and the motivation of dairy processing enterprises to produce qualified dairy products.

关 键 词：乳品 复杂网络 演化博弈 协同治理 质量安全 

分 类 号：F407.82[经济管理—产业经济] F203