股市下行背景下股权质押对民营企业控制权与绩效的影响  

The Impact of Equity Pledge on the Control Rights and Business Performance of Private Enterprises in the Context of Stock Market Downturn

作　　者：冯科[1] 刘丹[1] FENG Ke;LIU Dan(School of Economics,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院,北京100871

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2024年第5期55-71,共17页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：随着股权质押规模的不断扩大及市场风险的不断增加,2018年我国股市出现股权质押危机。本文以2018年股价崩盘事件作为外生准自然实验,运用Logit-DID模型研究股市下行时股权质押对上市民营企业控制权与绩效的影响。研究发现:股价下跌时,若企业无股权质押,大股东会增加自身持股,降低控制权丧失风险;当企业股权质押达到一定比例,股价下跌会增加企业控制权丧失风险;企业控制权转移有损未来经营绩效,而缓解股权质押危机的纾困政策可能导致民营企业转变为国有资本控股,通过影响经理人代理问题加剧企业绩效损失。研究结论对优化资本市场监管执行、维持资产价格稳定、保护投资人与上市企业等方面具有重要启示意义。With the continuous expansion of equity pledge scale,the risk of stock market in China continued to increase,which resulted in the equity pledge crisis in 2018.The stock price crash in 2018 was used as an exogenous quasi natural experiment,and a Logit-DID model was applied to investigate the impact of equity pledge accompanied by the stock market downturn on the control rights and business performance of private enterprises.It is found that when the stock price decreases,major shareholders without equity pledge would increase their holdings,thereby the likelihood of losing control rights reduced.However,if a company had equity pledge and reached a certain proportion,a decrease in stock price would increase the likelihood of losing control rights.The transfer of corporate control rights might be accompanied by future business performance losses.Besides,the“Relief”policy,accompanied by the transformation of a private enterprise's actual controller into state-owned capital,would result in more significant losses in corporate performance with managerial agency problem as mechanism.This conclusion has important implications for optimizing capital market regulatory enforcement,maintaining asset price stability,and protecting investors and listed companies.

关 键 词：股权质押 股价崩盘 纾困政策 企业控制权 企业经营绩效 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F832.5[经济管理—国民经济]