休谟的认识辩护理论初探  

Hume’s Theory on Epistemic Justification

作　　者：赵国锋 ZHAO Guo-feng(School of Maxism,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000)

机构地区：[1]安徽工程大学马克思主义学院,安徽芜湖241000

出　　处：《阴山学刊》2024年第6期56-61,共6页Yinshan Academic Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“西方百年元伦理学史研究”(19ZDA036)。

摘　　要：休谟的认识论中包含了一些传统的认识辩护思想,其认识辩护思想是围绕着以下三个问题展开的:第一,什么是信念?第二,我们可以拥有哪几种认识辩护?第三,我们的物理信念是如何得到认识辩护的?在解答了这三个问题的基础上,休谟最终否定了我们的物理信念获得认识辩护的可能性。虽然休谟的认识辩护思想不可避免地存在着所有传统认识辩护理论普遍会有的问题,但是,它依然是当代认识论的探讨所绕不开的一个部分。There is a traditional theory on epistemic justification in Hume’s epistemology.This theory focus on three questions:Firstly,what is belief?Secondly,how many kinds of justification can we have?Thirdly,how do our beliefs about physical objects get their justification?After answering these questions,it denies that our beliefs about physical objects can be justified.There are some traditional problems on his theory,but there is no doubt that his idea is an important scour of contemporary theories on epistemic justification.

关 键 词：休谟 认识辩护 物理信念 

分 类 号：B561.291[哲学宗教—外国哲学]