凸性契约设计与CEO薪酬契约有效性:来自薪酬粘性的证据  

Convex Contract Design and the Effectiveness of CEO Compensation Contracts:Evidence from Compensation Stickiness

作　　者：王永恒 孙世敏[1] 王雅文 WANG Yong-heng;SUN Shi-min;WANG Ya-wen(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2024年第12期105-122,共18页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL017)。

摘　　要：CEO薪酬粘性是衡量薪酬契约有效性的重要指标,本文以2012-2022年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,研究凸性契约设计视角下CEO薪酬契约的有效性。研究发现:(1)CEO薪酬与公司业绩呈边际递增的凸性关系,业绩较高时CEO薪酬业绩敏感性更强,中国上市公司CEO的薪酬契约存在凸性激励成分。(2)凸性薪酬契约偏好与CEO薪酬粘性显著正相关。具体而言,当面临财务困境、CEO自由裁量权较高及竞业限制较强时,公司偏好采用凸性薪酬契约,CEO薪酬粘性更显著;当存在大客户、机构投资者持股较高及产品市场竞争度较高时,公司不偏好凸性薪酬契约,CEO薪酬粘性不明显。这表明薪酬粘性是股东为激励CEO提高风险承担水平而设计的凸性薪酬契约,凸性契约设计视角下CEO薪酬契约在一定程度上是有效的,该结论在一系列稳健性检验下仍然成立。CEO compensation stickiness is an important indicator to measure the effectiveness of compensation contracts.This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022 as the research object to study the effectiveness of CEO compensation contracts from the perspective of convex contract design.The findings are as follows:(1)There is a marginal increasing convex relationship between CEO compensation and company performance,and CEO compensation performance sensitivity is stronger when performance is higher.There are convex incentive components in CEOs'compensation contracts of Chinese listed companies.(2)The preference for convex compensation contracts is significantly positively correlated with CEO compensation stickiness.Specifically,when facing with financial difficulties,high CEO discretion and strong competition restrictions,companies prefer to adopt convex compensation contracts,and CEO compensation stickiness is more significant.When there are large customers,institutional investors have high shareholding and product market competition is high,companies do not prefer convex compensation contracts,and CEO compensation stickiness is not obvious.This indicates that compensation stickiness is a convex compensation contract designed by shareholders to encourage CEOs to improve their risk taking level.CEO compensation contracts are effective to a certain extent from the perspective of convex contract design,and this conclusion is still valid under a series of robustness tests.

关 键 词：凸性契约设计 薪酬契约有效性 薪酬粘性 风险激励 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]