进化伦理学与自然主义谬误——理查兹对进化伦理学的辩护是否成功  

Evolutionary Ethics and Naturalistic Fallacy——Is Richards’Defense of Evolutionary Ethics Successful?

作　　者：丁雨姗 DING Yu-shan(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第6期1-7,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：湖南省哲学社会科学基金青年项目“康德的‘应当蕴含能够原则及其当代效应研究’”(22YBQ005)。

摘　　要：一般认为,进化伦理学尝试从进化生物学事实中推出规范性结论,犯了自然主义谬误。然而,作为进化伦理学的主要代表,理查兹认为自然主义谬误不是谬误。对此,乔伊斯进行了反驳。但他的反驳不能真正驳倒理查兹。一方面,身份或职位(是)与相应的义务和规范(应当)同时被设立,“是”与“应当”没有鸿沟;另一方面,理查兹将“应当”定义成连接属性和期待,而属性本质也是一种“是”,因而,从“是”可以推出“应当”。通过对推断原则内容和功用的澄清,以及对“应当”不同意义的区分,一些可能的反驳也不成立。理查兹对进化伦理学的辩护为消解自然主义谬误提供了一种可能性。It is generally believed that evolutionary ethics commits the naturalistic fallacy by trying to derive norma⁃tive conclusions from the facts of evolutionary biology.However,Richards believes that the naturalistic fallacy is not a fallacy.Joyce considers Richards’defense unsuccessful.But his rebuttal doesn’t really refute Richards.On the one hand,identity or position and corresponding obligations and norms are stipulated at the same time,and there is no gap between“is”and“ought”;on the other hand,Richards thinks that the minimal semantic meaning of“ought”is connecting property and expectation,and the property is also a kind of“is”,from which“ought”can be derived.By clarifying the content and function of the inference principle and distinguishing the different meanings of“ought”,some possible objections are also shown to be unreasonable.Richards successfully demon⁃strates that there is no naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary ethics.Richards’defense of evolutionary ethics offers one way to resolve the naturalistic fallacy.

关 键 词：进化伦理学 自然主义谬误 理查兹 乔伊斯 是与应当 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]