维特根斯坦论普遍性  

Wittgenstein on Generality

作　　者：周志荣[1] ZHOU Zhi-rong(School of Philosophy,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学哲学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第6期37-43,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“逻辑词汇的历史演进与哲学问题研究”(20&ZD046)。

摘　　要：维特根斯坦区分了普遍性和(一阶)量化,他将全称和存在量化命题分别理解为逻辑积与逻辑和这两种真值函式。按照维特根斯坦的观点,普遍性并非也不能由量化命题来表达。这不是因为维特根斯坦未能掌握一阶量化逻辑的技术或者在他的符号系统中,量化命题具有表达力上的缺陷,不足以表达普遍性,而是因为他对普遍性持有一种与弗雷格、罗素的经典观点不同的特别看法。他认为普遍性是不可说的,只能通过量化命题中的约束变元显示出来。在他的早期哲学中,可以找到三个层面的原因来解释维特根斯坦为何持有这种独特的普遍性观念。Wittgenstein dissociates generality from(first-ordered)quantification and treats the universal and exist⁃ence quantified propositions as logical product and logical sum,respectively,which are truth functions.According to Wittgenstein,generality cannot be expressed by these two propositions.The reason is not that Wittgenstein doesn’t learn all methodology and techniques of modern quantificational logic or his symbolism is defective in ex⁃pressive power such that generality cannot be expressed in it,but that he holds a totally special conception of gener⁃ality differing from Frege and Russell’s traditional conception.He thinks that generality is unsayable and it can on⁃ly be shown by bound variables in quantificational propositions.There are three reasons contained in his philosophy in Tractatus that are found out to explain why he holds such a distinct conception of generality.

关 键 词：维特根斯坦 普遍性 量词 形式概念 不可说 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]