国企混改中的治理机制非对称性与风险承担  

Asymmetric Governance Mechanisms and Risk-taking in the Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：李胜楠[1] 朱叱云 王佳琦 姚守宇 娄艺琳 Li Shengnan;Zhu Chiyun;Wang Jiaqi;Yao Shouyu;Lou Yilin(Department of Management and Economics,Tianjin University;FAW Jiefang Group Co.,Ltd.)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2024年第9期113-126,共14页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL113)资助。

摘　　要：本文从国有企业混合所有制改革过程中所有权与控制权非对等配置的逻辑出发,以我国2008—2021年沪深A股混合所有制国有上市公司为样本,探究非国有控股股东超额委派董事对混改国企风险承担的影响。研究发现,非国有股东超额委派董事对混改国企的风险承担发挥了促进作用,且超额委派董事比例越大,企业风险承担水平越高;在政府放权意愿较高、高管政治晋升预期较小的国有企业中,非国有股东超额委派董事对风险承担水平的促进作用更显著。机制检验发现,非国有股东超额委派董事能够缓解国有企业的超额雇员,提升高管的薪酬激励,从而提高了企业的风险承担水平。此外,非国有股东超额委派董事通过提升混改国企的风险承担水平,提高了企业未来一年和未来两年的企业价值。本文为非国有股东从董事会层面深度参与治理的积极作用提供了经验证据,对新时代深化国企混合所有制改革、实现非国有资本与国有资本的深度融合具有一定的政策意义。The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed to“actively develop a mixed-ownership economy,”marking the beginning of a new round of state-owned enterprise(SOE)reform.In the current phase of mixed-ownership reform,many SOEs remain at a superficial level of mixing.Although non-state capital has been introduced at the equity level,it has not been granted sufficient control rights.The key to overcoming challenges in advancing the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs lies in ensuring the deep participation of non-state capital in corporate governance and achieving positive governance outcomes.In practice,an increasing number of non-state shareholders in mixed-ownership SOEs are appointing board members in excess of their equity proportion.By strengthening the power of non-state shareholders on boards of directors,their willingness and ability to participate in corporate governance have been effectively enhanced.Whether non-state shareholders’influence beyond their equity limitations,granting them greater decision-making power in major issues,can improve SOEs`risk-taking level and elevate their risk-taking capacity remains an open question.Additionally,the impact of different governance contexts on the governance effectiveness of non-state shareholders requires further empirical investigation.This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of the unequal distribution of ownership and control within SOE mixed-ownership reforms,focus-ing on the role of non-state shareholders in reshaping governance and decision-making dynamics.Drawing on data from Chinese A-share list-ed companies with mixed and state ownership from 2008 to 2021,it ex-amines how the over-appointment of directors by non-state controlling shareholders influences the risk-taking behavior of these enterprises.The study finds that such over-appointments significantly enhance the risk-taking levels of reformed SOEs,establishing a positive relationship between the proportion of non-state-appointed directors and the

关 键 词：非国有股东治理 非对称性 超额委派董事 风险承担 国企混改 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济] F272.3