碳配额分配策略对绿色与非绿色产品制造商竞争的影响  

Effects of Carbon Quota Allocation Strategies on Competition between Green and Non-green Product Manufacturers

作　　者：尚文芳[1] 谷鑫涛 李涛[2] SHANG Wenfang;GU Xintao;LI Tao(School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;School of Management,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001 [2]郑州大学管理学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《管理现代化》2024年第6期157-166,共10页Modernization of Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划类项目“低碳需求信息更新背景下供应链减排协调机制研究”(项目编号:22YJ630069);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“中原城市群综合交通体系结构优化研究”(项目编号:2023BJJ083);河南省重点研发与推广专项(软科学)“多层级关联视角下中原城市群综合交通系统韧性评估方法研究”(项目编号:242400411089);河南省高等学校重点科研项目“复杂灾害情景下中原城市群关联交通系统韧性评估方法研究”(项目编号:24A630032)。

摘　　要：在碳交易政策背景下,考虑市场需求不确定性和绿色与非绿色产品制造商之间的价格博弈,引入不同碳配额分配方式,研究其对两制造商减排和定价决策的影响。通过构建并对比分析不同碳配额分配方式下绿色与非绿色产品制造商的博弈模型,得出如下结论:(1)历史法和基准线法下,市场规模越大,减排难度越低,单位产品的碳减排量就越高,且市场规模增大对绿色产品需求的促进作用大于非绿色产品。(2)历史基准线混合法下单位产品的碳减排量介于历史法和基准线法之间,且随着基准线法所占比重的增大而增大。奖惩机制下单位产品的碳减排量随着奖惩系数的增大呈现先增后减的凹性变化,且始终大于历史法下的减排量。(3)历史法下绿色产品的市场份额小于基准线法下,历史基准线混合法下的市场份额介于二者之间。奖惩机制可以在增大绿色产品需求的同时降低非绿色产品的需求,使其获得大于基准线法的市场份额。论文研究有助于为政府碳配额分配策略制订提供参考,为供应链成员的决策提供依据。In the context of carbon trading policy,considering the uncertainty of market demand and the price game between green and non-green product manufacturers,different carbon quota allocation methods were introduced to study their impact on emission reduction and pricing decisions of the two manufacturers.Through the construction and comparative analysis of the game model of green and non-green product manufacturers under different carbon quota allocation methods,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Under the historical method and the baseline method,the larger the market size,the lower the emission reduction difficulty,the higher the carbon emission reduction per unit product,and the increase in market size has a greater promoting effect on the demand for green products than that of non-green products.(2)The carbon emission reduction per unit product under the historical baseline mixed method is between the historical method and the baseline method,and increases with the increase of the proportion of the baseline method.Under the mechanism of reward and punishment,the carbon emission reduction per unit product increases first and then decreases with the increase of the reward and punishment coefficient,and is always greater than the emission reduction under the historical method.(3)The market share of green products under the historical method is smaller than that under the baseline method,and the market share under the mixed historical baseline method is between the two.The reward and punishment mechanism can increase the demand for green products while reducing the demand for non-green products,so that they can obtain more market share than the baseline method.This paper is helpful to provide reference for the government's carbon quota allocation strategy and provide basis for supply chain members'decision-making.

关 键 词：历史法 基准线法 历史基准线混合法 制造商竞争 

分 类 号：F2723[经济管理—企业管理]