论耶可比的《大卫休谟论信念》中的信念观  

On the Concept of Belief in Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's David Humeüber den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus

作　　者：张云涛[1] ZHANG Yun-tao(Wuhan University,Wuhan 430075,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学,武汉430075

出　　处：《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第6期22-31,共10页The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金一般项目“德国早期浪漫主义哲学研究”(项目号:24YJA720014)的阶段性研究成果;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助。

摘　　要：耶可比在《论斯宾诺莎的学说》中首次提出的信念学说遭到了非理性的狂热和迷信的指责。为此,他的《大卫休谟论信念》给出了辩护。该书批判了表象实在论和观念论,针锋相对地提出了“坚定的实在论”。这种实在论将认识主体与认识对象的关系视作“我”与“你”的对话性关系,强调认识的实践基础,由此打破了过去的认识论只从个人的、内在的意识来探究信念和认识的传统。借助于这种新的知觉理论,耶可比研究了一般的知觉经验和信念以及有关超验存在的经验和信念的可能性及其原理。信念不是个人的、内在的主观相信,而是在人与世界打交道的社会性实践活动中产生和培育起来的对自我、世界和超验存在的存在的确定性,基于实在本身在知觉活动中的自我启示和自我呈现,因而不是非理性的、盲目的。The theory of belief first proposed by Jacobi in On the Doctrine of Spinoza was criticized for irrational fanaticism and superstition.In response to this,his David Humeüber den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus gives a defense.The book criticizes representative realism and idealism,and puts forward“firm realism”tit for tat.This kind of realism regards the relationship between the subject and the object of knowing as a dialogical relationship between“I”and“you”,and emphasizes the practical basis of knowing,thereby breaking the tradition of the previous epistemology that only explored belief and knowledge from the personal and inner consciousness.With the aid of this new theory of perception,Jacobi examined the possibilities and principles of perceptual experience and belief in general,as well as the experience of and belief in a transcendent existence.Belief is not a kind of personal and inner subjective believing,but the certainty of the existence of self,the world and a transcendent existence that is generated and cultivated in the social practical activities of dealing with the world.It is based on the self-revelation and self-presentation of reality itself in the activities of perception,and thus not irrational or blind.

关 键 词：耶可比 信念 知觉经验 直接实在论 实践 

分 类 号：B516.39[哲学宗教—外国哲学]