政府主导型国家储备林PPP运行模式演化博弈分析——以贵州毕节为例  

An Evolutionary Game of PPP Operation Mode of Government-dominated National Reserve Forest-A Case Study of Bijie,Guizhou Province

作　　者：凌仕全 胡超 董加云 LING Shiquan;HU Chao;DONG Jiayun(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Forestry University,Nanjing 210037,China)

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,南京210037

出　　处：《林业经济问题》2024年第6期607-616,共10页Issues of Forestry Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72473067);江苏省社会科学基金项目研究成果(24ZZB002)。

摘　　要：以贵州毕节为例,构建地方政府、国有企业和农业合作社三方共同参与的演化博弈模型,探究政府主导下各方主体协同合作的内在机理。结果表明:(1)国有企业积极合作的概率与政府的监管力度相关,提高政府的初始参与意愿更能有效促进项目顺利实施;(2)只有当上级政府的奖惩力度大于对国有企业的投机处罚时,地方政府选择积极参与的概率才与初始意愿正向变动;(3)公共预算支出的差异是地方政府作出决策的主要考量指标之一;(4)提高国有企业积极合作的概率需要从加强政府行政监管和提高企业责任意识2个角度展开。据此,为促进政府主导型国家储备林PPP项目可持续发展,提出了提高项目经济效益、完善多层次奖惩机制、多措并举提高国有企业积极性等政策建议。⑴Background——China’s national reserve forest construction has achieved remarkable comprehensive results,and has become an important strategic project in China,but its development faces financing difficulties,insufficient social capital investment and other problems.In order to solve these problems,Public-Private Partnership(PPP)has become an important operation mode of China’s national reserve forest construction.However,the PPP operation mode dominated by the government is faced with problems such as the increasing financial burden of the government and the lack of enthusiasm of social capital.How to promote the healthy operation of the PPP operationmodel is a practical problem worth exploring.⑵Methods——Based on the analysis of the significant characteristics of the PPP operation mode of the national reserve forest construction in Bijie,Guizhou Province,this paper put forward the basic hypotheses,and took the PPP operation mode of the national reserve forest construction in Bijie,Guizhou Province as an example to build an evolutionary game model involving the local governments,state-owned enterprises and agricultural cooperatives,and explore the internal mechanism of the tripartite cooperation under the domination of the governments.⑶Results——First,the degree of importance and participation of the state-owned enterprises in the project is mainly related to the participation of the governments.When the superior governments participate in the project with strong reward and punishment mechanism and the local governments participate in the project with strong supervision,the state-owned enterprises are more inclined to actively participate in the projectconstruction,and the agricultural cooperatives also have the motivation to participate.Second,when the rewards and punishments of the superior governmentsare less than the punishments of the state-owned enterprises for speculation,the probability of the local governments to choose to actively participate changes in the reverse direction of the i

关 键 词：政府主导型 国家储备林PPP 运行模式 演化博弈分析 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济] X22[环境科学与工程—环境科学]