Feyerabend and Peirce on Pluralism and Inquiry  

皮尔斯和费耶阿本德论多元主义和探究

作　　者：Jamie Shaw 雅米·肖(汉诺威莱布尼茨大学哲学研究所,德国汉诺威30451)

机构地区：[1]Institute for Philosophy,Leibniz Universitaet Hannover,Hannover,Germany,30451

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2024年第12期1-17,共17页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：The purpose of this paper is to synthesize a conception of inquiry from the insights of Paul Feyerabend and C.S.Peirce.Here,I contend that Peirce's account of inquiry is overly narrow.More poignantly,I show how Peirce's motto that one should not block the road of inquiry is in conflict with his rejection of skepticism.This is shown using Feyerabend's arguments for pluralism.Nevertheless,I sketch an alternative position that borrows insights from both Peirce and Feyerabend.This position,I contend,retains the crucial elements of each position that drove them while critically developing them in a coherent fashion.This synthesized position offers the beginning of a novel approach to modelling divisions of epistemic labor.本文旨在依据费耶阿本德和皮尔斯之洞见来综合探究思想。经过论证,我主张皮尔斯的探究阐释过分狭隘。更重要的是,我证明了:皮尔斯的座右铭“人们不应阻塞探究之路”与其拒绝怀疑论相冲突。由此可见,需要运用费耶阿本德的多元主义论证。不过,我借用皮尔斯和费耶阿本德两者的洞见概述了另一种观点。我论证阐明:这种观点保留了两者观点各自的重要元素,而且,在以融贯方式批判地发展那些洞见过程中,这些元素促发了它们。这种观点开创了一种认识研究分工建模的新方法。

关 键 词：PEIRCE Feyerabend PLURALISM Economics of discovery INQUIRY SCEPTICISM 

分 类 号：B503.91[哲学宗教—外国哲学] N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]